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ARTICLES
A LEGISLATIVE CONCEPTION OF
LEGISLATIVE SUPREMACY
Edward 0 Correza*
I. INTRODUCTION
This article explores the principle of legislative supremacy and
the obligations it imposes on courts in interpreting and applying
statutes. The proposition that courts should respect legislative su-
premacy is so often stated that it seems self-evident. But what is
legislative supremacy and why should courts respect it? Although a
number of different conceptions of legislative supremacy have been
suggested,' the concept remains elusive.2 Depending on how the
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and Staff Director, Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust Monopolies and Business Rights.
The author wishes to thank Stephen Subnn, Wendy Parmet, Stephen Ross and Richard
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Hayes, Ellen Bach, Michael Smith, and Marjone Boone for helpful research assistance.
i. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 286-93
(1985) [hereinafter FEDERAL COURTS] (suggesting that the judiciary should put themselves
in the legislature's shoes when interpreting a statute); Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of
Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 59, 60 (1988)
[hereinafter Original Intent] (arguing that the intent of the legislature is the law and the
judiciary's job is to decipher the mentality of the legislature); Frank H. Easterbrook, The
Supreme Court, 1983 Term - Foreword: The Court and the Economic Systemn, 98 HARV.
L. REV. 4, 60 (1984) [hereinafter 1983 Term] (characterizing judges as agents of the
legislative branch); William N. Eskridge, Spinning Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
principle is articulated, legislative supremacy can function as a
broad constraint on courts or a very narrow one. A court that
views this constraint narrowly is likely to view its policymaking
authority broadly.
This article proposes a conception of legislative supremacy
based on the way in which legislators might formulate the prin-
ciple. In particular, this article explains how legislators would like-
ly characterize their own legislative commands, and it suggests the
interpretive rules they would want courts to follow. Because there
is no "representative" legislator, constructing legislators' views
about legislative supremacy necessarily involves speculation. How-
ever, the exercise will, nevertheless, be helpful if the reader accepts
certain assumptions about legislators' values and about the way
legislators' view their role in the constitutional scheme. These
assumptions are that legislators want statutes to be effective, that
they want to maximize the policymaking authority of the legisla-
ture, and that they want to minimize the policymaking authority of
the judiciary.3
The essentials of my argument are these. Looking at statutory
interpretation from the legislative perspective has a powerful justifi-
cation. If legislators have the authority to decide policy, they also
have the authority to determine how their statements of policy will
be interpreted. Thus, the legislative perspective provides some
useful insights about principles of statutory interpretation. First, the
legislative process suggests how legislators view the legislative
command. In particular, the extent to which legislators rely on
committee reports, floor debates and other formal memorializations
of the process of enactment, shows that they expect courts to con-
sider these same resources in interpreting legislative commands.
319, 343 (1989) (urging legislative supremacy to encompass deference to both the drafting
and current legislatures); Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Suprem-
acy, 78 GEo. L.J. 281, 283 (1989) (asserting that legislatures are not exclusive lawmakers
but their supremacy enables them to modify common law doctrines); Richard A. Posner,
Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and the Constitution,
37 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 179, 189-90 (1986) [hereinafter Legal Formalism] (comparing
judges to platoon commanders accepting orders from legislators).
2. See, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 1, at 343 ("The more deeply one considers legis-
lative supremacy, the more complex and ambiguous it becomes . . .
3. See infra text accompanying notes 47-51 for a discussion of these assumptions.
Sometimes these goals may be in conflict. For example, some statutes are ineffective as
written and require executive or judicial policymaking to make them work. In these cases
legislators want judicial policymaking to occur, as long as it is confined to the scope of
the legislature's authorization. See infra text accompanying notes 53-64.
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Second, the legislative process also suggests the weight legislators
want courts to place on different sources of information. For exam-
ple, legislators want statements made during the legislative process
to command substantial weight if the legislature as a whole has
had the opportunity to review and challenge them.4
Because legislators jealously guard their policymaking authori-
ty, they want courts to carry out clear commands with the mini-
mum policymaking judgments necessary. If legislative commands
were always clear, statutory interpretation would be (relatively)
easy. However, like any speaker who relies on the imprecise medi-
um of language, legislators' statements are frequently unclear. Nev-
ertheless, legislators want courts to give effect even to somewhat
unclear commands. If courts did not interpret unclear commands,
much legislation would go unenforced, and the legislature would be
faced with the continual need to revise and clarify legislative enact-
ments.
The notion of an "unclear" command is itself difficult to pin
down. From the legislators' perspective, a limited degree of uncer-
tainty is not a license for judicial policymaking. Like any speaker,
legislators want listeners to be cautious and to take into account
the legislators' prior actions when interpreting their statements,
Reliance on presumptions can help avoid erroneous interpretations
because it allows the interpreter to evaluate the meaning of legisla-
tive commands in light of the interpreter's subjective "prior proba-
bility" that the legislature would adopt a particular policy. These
"prior probabilities" can be based on a variety of considerations,
but they must be faithful to legislative values and preferences. The
justification for relying on presumptions is strongest when they are
based on a well-established pattern of legislative behavior. If legis-
lators have acted consistently, they will probably continue to act
that way.
Some legislative commands remain genuinely unclear to the
judiciary even after they have considered valid presumptions and
attempted to clarify the legislators' intent. In these cases, a court
may fairly question what the legislators want done. This article
argues that legislators want courts to implement ambiguous legisla-
tive command by considering extra-legislative values. To guard
against unrestrained and subjective judicial policymaking, however,
legislators want courts to confine their reliance on extra-legislative
4. See infra text accompanying notes 94-108.
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values to those that have been validated by a majoritarian process.
Thus, legislators only want courts to rely on extra-legislative values
that have a claim to being "law".
The article proceeds this way: Part II summarizes the justifica-
tion for the principle of legislative supremacy. Part Im discusses
the relationship between legislative supremacy and statutory inter-
pretation. Part IV introduces the idea of a legislative conception of
legislative supremacy. Part V discusses the relationship between
legislative values and statutory interpretation. Part VI considers
how legislators are likely to view legislative commands. Part VII
addresses the general problem of uncertain legislative commands
and discusses the relationship between probability theory and the
use of presumptions. Finally, Part VIII discusses judicial reliance
on extra-legislative values in cases of "true ambiguity" - when
legislative commands remain unclear even after a broad inquiry
about meaning and reliance on appropriate presumptions. The Ap-
pendix explains how probability theory, particularly the Bayes
theorem, can be used to illustrate some of the issues raised by
unclear commands.
II. THE RATIONALE FOR LEGISLATIVE SUPREMACY
Although there are difficulties in defining legislative suprema-
cy, the core of the principle dictates that courts should respect and
apply policy decisions of the legislature. There are two bases that
justify such a principle. The first is positivist in form - courts
should respect legislative supremacy because this respect is required
by the Constitution.5 The second is normative in form - courts
should respect legislative supremacy because society will be better
off if they do.
A. The Positivist Argument
At least a certain conception of legislative supremacy is inher-
ent in the constitutional scheme.6 Within limits, Congress may
5. "Positivism" is used here to mean a belief in law as a set of rules to be obeyed
apart from the morality of the rules. See Wolfgang Friedmann, LEGAL THEORY 257 (5th
ed. 1967) ("The separation, in principle, of the law as it is, and the law as it ought to
be, is the most fundamental philosophical assumption of legal positivism."); H.L.A. Hart,
Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 599 (1958)
(asserting positivists would agree that a rule which violates moral standards is still a valid
rule).
6. See TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978) ("Once Congress, exercising its dele-
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delegate its policymaking power to the other branches,7 but the
judicial branch may not usurp the policymaking power on its
own.
8
The positivist argument, based on the Constitution's allocation
of powers among the branches, only goes so far. Congress has the
power to make social policy in many areas, but its constitutional
grant is neither unlimited9 nor exclusive"I in most areas. Yet,
when Congress exercises its Article I "legislative powers,"11 the
text of the Constitution, 2 the intent of the Framers1 3 and the Su-
preme Court's interpretation of the role of Congress all support the
conclusion that the Constitution requires courts to defer to
Congress's supreme policymaking authority.14
gated powers, has decided the order of priorities in a given area, it is for the Executive
to administer the laws and for the courts to enforce them when enforcement is sought.");
Farber, supra note 1, at 283; Martin H. Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and
the Limits of the Judicial Function, 94 YALE LJ. 71, 76 (1984) (suggesting that the judi-
cial branch will not openly ignore a law except in the infrequent circumstance where the
law is unconstitutional). Cf. Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal
Courts, 52 U. CIl. L. REV. 1, 9 (1985) (discussing the Supreme Court's role in determin-
ing how much a legislature's lawmaking ability can be exercised by the federal courts).
7. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989) ("We also have recog-
nized . . . that the separation-of-powers principle, and the nondelegation doctrine in partic-
ular, do not prevent Congress from obtaining the assistance of its coordinate Branches.").
8. See Felix W. Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Rending of Statutes, 47 COLUM.
L. REv. 527, 533 (1947) (admonishing judges to serve the limited function of interpreting
the laws that the legislative has created); Max Radin, A Short Way With Statutes, 56
HARV. L. REV. 388, 395-96 (1942) (asserting that while courts sometimes disregard com-
mon law or custom, they do not openly ignore a valid statute).
9. Of course, the most significant check on congressional supremacy is the Constitu-
tion itself. This article discusses only the exercise of Constitutionally-authorized legislative
power and the interpretation of constitutional statutes.
10. Congress probably has exclusive authority to act only in a narrow range of deci-
sions, such as exercise of the impeachment power and, perhaps, the power to tax. See
JAMES 0. FREEDMAN, CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY: THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS AND
A.RI CAN GOVERNMENT 85-88 (1978) (positing that the Framers gave legislative powers
exclusively to the most representative of the three branches because they thought that
Congress' political responsiveness would assure fairness and legitimacy); see also Farber,
supra note 1, at 283.
11. U.S. Cont. art I, § 1.
12. See Farber, supra note 1, at 293 n.57 ("At the federal level, the supremacy prin-
ciple gains added authority from the supremacy clause, which makes valid statute 'the
supreme law of the land.").
13. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 469 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.
1961) (asserting that court should avoid exercising its own "WILL instead of JUDG-
MENT" and "substituti[ng] its own] pleasure to that of the legislative body"), cited in
Public Citizen v. United States Dept. of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 471 (1989) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
14. This article discusses principally the United States Congress and its relationship to
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B. The Normative Argument
The second argument for legislative supremacy is a normative
one, based on a realistic understanding of the political process.
Elected representatives are politically accountable. Judges with life
tenure are not. Members of the legislature are chosen in a highly
political process in which the public has an opportunity to hear the
policy positions they 'support and the general social values they
will attempt to advance. If the public is dissatisfied with their
elected representatives, they can remove them at the next election.
Judges, at least federal judges, are chosen in a much less political
way, and the public has no direct role in their selection or remov-
al.
The public's indirect role in selecting judges - voting for a
President who nominates judges they prefer or voting for a Senator
who refuses to confirm judges they do not prefer - is highly
attenuated. Judicial nominees rarely make their views known to any
significant degree, even on their approach to constitutional interpre-
tation, and almost never on general social policy. On rare occa-
sions, a prospective judge's views on matters of constitutional
interpretation have become widely known and have played a role
in confirmation. 5 Though rare, these occasions can be highly sig-
nificant, and they allow for some political accountability in the
selection process, but only very indirectly. 6 Even if there is some
the federal court system. Most state constitutional schemes are similar and, thus, analogous
principals typically (though not necessarily) apply. In some respects, the different proce-
dures of state legislatures suggest different considerations in regard to some of the argu-
ments. See infra note 87 and accompanying text.
15. The nomination of Judge Robert Bork to the Supreme Court led to extraordinarily
probing hearings regarding the nominee's substantive views on constitutional theory. The
historical tradition has been quite different. See, e.g., Ronald D. Rotunda, The Confirma-
tion Process of Supreme Court Justices in the Modern Era, 37 EMORY L.J. 559, 559-62
(1988). The unusual circumstances of the nomination, particularly Bork's extensive written
exposition of his views prior to the hearings, facilitated a more substantive inquiry. The
subsequent hearings on the nominations of Anthony Kennedy, David Souter and Clarence
Thomas suggest that the Bork hearings may have been unique.
16. The accountability is indirect because the President, who nominates, and the Sena-
tors, who confirm, are held accountable at the polls, not the judge. Professor Ackerman
has argued that the judicial nomination and confirmation process itself can represent a
form of popular law-making which can even serve to justify a reinterpretation of the
Constitution. See Bruce A. Ackerman, Essays on the Supreme Court Appointment Process
Transformative Appointments, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1164, 1172-73 (1988). Whatever the
legitimacy and significance of such transformative moments, they are far too infrequent to
serve as a basis for a conclusion that judges are politically accountable in a direct and
1134 [Vol. 42:1129
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accountability in the selection process, the absence of political
accountability in removal puts judges in a far different posture
from elected representatives.
Political accountability is only the first step in the argument,
of course. Judges might be less politically accountable, yet better at
making social policy.17 While the normative argument for legisla-
tive policymaking is based on formidable notions of accountability
and majoritarianism, the argument for judicial policymaking is
based on disturbing observations about how the political process
really works.'8 While there are well-recognized flaws in legislative
policymaking,"' there are two fundamental risks in judicial
policymaking. First, judicially-derived policies may be- anti-
majoritarian, that is, at odds with the values of the majority. Sec-
ond, judicially-derived policies lack the legitimacy that comes from
majoritarian control. While judicial policies are not necessarily anti-
majoritarian, they are at least non-majoritarian and, therefore, their
substantial way.
17. It can be argued that judges have some advantages in making policy. See, e.g.,
William N. Eskridge, Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PENN. L. REV.
1007 (1989). According to Professor Eskridge:
Public values thinkers believe that the dialogue by which public values are
articulated is best performed by the courts, not just by the legislature. This
belief reflects disappointment in the legislature's ability to carry on a sustained
dialogue as much as it reflects faith in the courts. Modem political science
scholarship depicts the legislature as typically paralyzed and unable to take
constructive action; when it does bestir itself to enact laws, they are typically
feeble compromises or worse, unprincipled doles to special interest
groups . . . . Courts have the ability to contribute more substantially to the
politics of values because their independence reduces the inertia and interest
group pressure of everyday politics, and because their open, reasoned and incre-
mental decisionmaking assures a more rational discussion of public issues.
Id. at 1016 (citations omitted).
18. There are several different critiques of the legislative process. Public choice the-
orists point to the irrational results of decision rules and the effects of economic incen-
tives on political outcomes. See, e.g., JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TuLLOC, THE
CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1965);
George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI-
ENCE (1971). A more traditional criticism focuses on the power of special interests and
the unseemly aspects of lobbying. For a summary of criticisms of the political process,
see William N. Eskridge & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Rea-
soning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 334-35 (1990).
19. Legislatures provide a good vehicle for exploring abuses. Campaign contributions,
special interest lobbying and irrational decision rules are largely open to public scrutiny.
Judicial decision-making, by its nature, is more closed to public view and assessment.
Personal biases and unseemly intra-judicial bargaining, to the extent they affect opinions,
are hidden from view. The openness of the legislature's flaws is part of the reason it
suffers by comparison.
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legitimacy is suspect.
An extensive body of scholarship argues for the frank incorpo-
ration of extra-legislative or "public" values in judicial interpreta-
tion.2" By incorporating public values into their interpretation of a
legislative command not communicated clearly by the legislature,
courts can eliminate the worst excesses of the legislative process.
Raw pluralism can be remolded to reach results which more close-
ly resemble the Madisonian ideal of policies that advance the broad
public interest.2 There is a powerful appeal in the notion that un-
just, special interest and irrational legislation can be reformed by
courts. The great weakness in all public values analysis, however,
is that values not communicated by the enacting legislature do not
have the imprimatur of majoritarian approval.22 Public values are
open to the criticism that, depending on their source, they rest on a
lower plane of legitimacy.23 Public values may appear to have
majoritarian approval if they reflect a broad social consensus, but
there is often more than one public value implicated in resolving
any interpretive problem. If they point in different directions
(which they often do), judges must balance one against the other,
assigning weights to each.24 Like the values themselves, the
20. See, e.g., T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 MiCH. L.
REV. 20, 24-27 (1988); Eskridge, supra note 17; William N. Eskridge & Philip R.
Frickey, Legislation Scholarship & Pedagogy in the Post Legal Process Era, 48 U. PITT.
L. REV. 691, 694-701 (1987); Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory
State, 103 HARV. L. REv. 405, 454 (1989).
21. See Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV.
29, 30-31 (1985) [hereinafter Interest Groups]; Eskridge, supra note 17, at 1072-73.
22. Public values scholars themselves recognize this weakness. See Daniel A. Farber &
Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEX. L. REv. 873, 910 (1987)
("The chances are all too great that 'public values' would simply correspond with the
judge's favored political program."); Eskridge, supra note 17, at 1083-84 (discussing cases
that suggest "the greatest danger of public values analysis in statutory interpretation is that
it will be decisively influenced by the political preferences of the Justices, who are sub-
ject to biases that are hard to defend in a modem democracy." (citations omitted)).
23. See infra notes 223-30 and accompanying text.
24. As an illustration of the difficulty, Professor Eskridge lists 25 different extra-legis-
lative "values," (by my count), which were incorporated into the statutory interpretation in
a small sampling of cases. Eskridge, supra note 17, at 1095-1104. Professor Sunstein
suggest 29 basic public values (as well as five over-arching principles for reconciling
conflicts among them) for interpreting modem regulatory statutes. Sunstein, supra note 20,
at 507-08. Just as the old canons of statutory interpretation were shown to be contradic-
tory, see Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decisions and the Rules
or Canons About How Statutes are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401 (1950),
a laundry list of public values inevitably contains values that, although worthwhile in
themselves, point in opposite directions in particular cases.
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weights they apply, which are frequently critical to the result, will
still have no majoritarian approval.
The case for turning to extra-legislative values is most persua-
sive when the legislative command is unclear.' When legislative
commands are unclear, public values can function as a "tiebreaker,"
tipping the scales to a more desirable result.2  However, the no-
tion of an "unclear" command is itself an aspect of a complete
conception of legislative supremacy.27 In particular, if a court too
easily concludes that a command is unclear, it may turn to public
values without really trying to discern the legislature's policy.
Courts that rely on extra-legislative values cannot depend upon
the legislature to specifically approve of and legitimate their deci-
sions. Thus, they must turn elsewhere to legitimate these values,
but where? The law itself - the Constitution, other statutes and
the common law - provides the most reliable source.28 However,
when a statute is constitutional, the circumstances under which
courts should turn to values derived from other laws are unclear.29
A search for "inherently" legitimate values beyond the Constitution
or other laws provides even less help.3" Values derived from the
25. See Eskridge, supra note 17, at 1065 ("While public values can readily be de-
fended in those cases where the text and legislative history are ambiguous, their invoca-
tion to trump a clear text and supportive legislative history would be inconsistent with
legislative supremacy.")
26. Id.
27. See infra text accompanying notes 126-45.
28. See Eskridge, supra note 17, at 1018-61; see also infra text accompanying notes
223-30.
29. See infra text accompanying notes 223-30.
30. The search for fundamental values almost inevitably begins with an attempt to an-
swer the shortcomings of utilitarianism. See H.L.A. Hart, Between Utility and Rights, 79
COLUM. L. REV. 829, 830, 829-31 (1979) (suggesting that the utilitarian ideal of the
greatest good for the greatest number denigrates the individual and her pleasure to that of
the aggregate, and thus "may license the grossest form of inequality in the actual treat-
ment of individuals"). Ambitious attempts to construct theories of fundamental rights and
values tend to fall into three categories depending upon whether the principal emphasis is
placed on liberty, equality, or the free market values of wealth maximization and efficient
allocation of resources. For an example of a liberty-based system, see ROBERT NOZICK,
ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 333-34 (1974) (positing that the utopian minimal state re-
spects individual rights and allows individuals to choose their own life and realize their
own ends, aided by the cooperation of others). For an example of an equality-based sys-
tem, see RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 180-82, 271-78 (1977) (asserting
that men and women possess a fundamental right to "equal concern and respect."). Both
of these systems are evaluated in Hart, supra. Scholars emphasizing the benefits of market
outcomes claim that a freely functioning market not only enhances liberty but is superior
to utilitarianism in advancing social welfare. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIcs
OF JUSTICE 48-115 (1981) (arguing that acts and institutions are good if "they maximize
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legislative process have a strong claim to legitimacy, if only be-
cause no other source of values has a stronger one.
C. Summary
Taken together the positivist and the normative arguments for
legislative supremacy are powerful, but they are not unassailable.
Even if the claim that the Constitution grants supreme
policymaking authority to the legislature is accepted, the validity of
a positivist claim to command respect for the Constitution is not
self-evident. One must also make the underlying normative assump-
tion that the legal system generating the law is itself legitimate.31
Even if majoritarian values have a stronger claim to legitimacy
than non-majoritarian values, "legitimacy" might not matter, or at
least might not be dispositive. Religious traditions, the common
law, the free market, and even wise judges' personal moral views
might lead to a fairer, or happier or "better" society. Like positiv-
ism, majoritarianism is not self-validating.
Since neither the positivist nor the normative claims for legis-
lative supremacy can be proved conclusively, at least not soon
enough for judges with a backiog of opinions to write, it is impos-
sible to prove whether legislators or judges are better policy mak-
ers. The whole exercise of defining legislative supremacy threatens
to collapse into a debate over the morality of the American legal
system or the inherent values of a good society. To develop a con-
ception of legislative supremacy, some working assumptions must
be accepted. For purposes of this article there are two. The first
assumption is that as a nation we are bound by the Constitutional
grant of policymaking authority to Congress. This policymaking au-
the wealth of society"). Some versions of utilitarianism however, advance welfare in a
way that is superior to market outcomes. See e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Legislation,
Well-Being and Public Choice, 57 U.CHI. L. REv. 63, 68-74 (1990) (suggesting that while
the market approach examines a policy's effects in society's wealth, money is an inade-
quate surrogate for determining social utility, individual satisfaction, and consumers' well
being). Of course, no consensus exists concerning any of these systems of values. Even if
a consensus emerged, each system offers only the most general answers to particular
problems of statutory interpretation.
31. See H.L.A. HART, A CONCEPT OF LAW 195-206 (1961) (discussing the imposition
of morality into the determination of legal validity). "What surely is most needed in order
to make men clear sighted in confronting the official abuse of power, is that they should
preserve the sense that the certification of something as legally valid is not conclusive of
the question of obedience, and that, however great the aura of majesty or authority which
the official system may have, its demands must in the end be submitted to a moral scru-
tiny." Id. at 206.
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thority is not exclusive but, when Congress is acting within consti-
tutional bounds, it is supreme. The second assumption is that val-
ues derived by the majoritarian institution of a legislature are pre-
sumptively more legitimate than values derived in a non-
majoritarian way by courts. Once these unverifiable assumptions
are made, the positivist and normative arguments make a powerful
case for legislative supremacy. While these rationales for legislative
supremacy illuminate the principle's meaning, they do not settle the
question of what legislative supremacy is.
II1. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AND
LEGISLATIVE SUPREMACY
There are three basic modes of statutory interpretation:
1) textual interpretation; 2) analysis of legislative intent; and 3)
incorporation of extra-legislative values. This categorization empha-
sizes the differences among complete theories of interpretation
advocated by individual jurists or scholars. In fact, any complete
theory of interpretation relies on all three modes of interpretation at
one time or another.32 However, competing theories of interpreta-
tion do tend to emphasize a particular mode: 1) textualism empha-
sizes an analysis of the statutory text;33 2) intentionalism empha-
sizes inquiry into the intent of the enacting legislature;M and 3)
32. Even a committed textualist like Justice Scalia occasionally relies on extra-
legislative values. See, e.g., Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 529 (1989)
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (turning to "the policy of the law in general and
the Rules of Evidence in particular" to help justify an interpretation of Rule 609(a)(1));
see also infra text accompanying notes 234-49 (discussing the Court's analysis of Bock
Laundry).
33. Textualism here is used synonymously with reliance on a "plain meaning rule."
One of the leading advocates of textualism, and certainly the most influential, is Justice
Scalia. His approach to interpretation is developed in a series of opinions. See, e.g., Im-
migration and Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452 (1987) (Scalia,
J., concurring in the judgment) (criticizing the Court's "exhaustive investigation of the
legislative history" in light of the plain meaning and structure of the Immigration and
Nationality Act); HJ. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 251 (1989)
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (criticizing the Court's
method of interpreting "pattern of racketeering activity" in a RICO action); Green v. Bock
Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. at 528 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (resorting to
extraneous materials, including the background and legislative history of the rule, to avoid
an "absurd, and perhaps unconstitutional, result"). Another advocate of textualism, though
in a somewhat modified version, is Judge Easterbrook. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes'
Domain, 50 U. Cmt. L. REV. 533 (1983). For a general discussion of textualism, see Wil-
liam N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualisin, 37 UCLA L. REv. 621 (1990).
34. A leading proponent of intentionalism is Judge Posner. See, e.g., POSNER, FEDERAL
COURTS, supra note 1, at 286-93. Posner suggests a version of intentionalism that at-
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public values analysis emphasizes incorporation of values into the
interpretive process, even if these values were not communicated
by the enacting legislature.35
There is little dispute that textualism, or reliance on the "plain
meaning" of the statutory text, constitutes a distinct and identifiable
approach to interpretation. Though somewhat less clearly,
intentionalism is also distinct and identifiable. But a problem re-
mains characterizing the wide variety of other systems of interpre-
tation. For purposes of this article all approaches that emphasize
substantial reliance on values other than those communicated by
the enacting legislature are combined into a broad category of
"public values analysis." 36 "Purposivism" falls more naturally into
intentionalism or public values analysis depending on whether the
legislative purpose to guide courts in interpretation is viewed as the
tempts "imaginary reconstruction," or recreation of the legislators' attitudes and desires at
the time of enactment. Id. at 286. Posner's is not the only version of intentionalism. See,
e.g., Earl M. Maltz, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Power: The Case for a Modi-
fied Intentionalist Approach, 63 TuL. L. REV. 1 (1988) (arguing that only a theory of
interpretation based on intentionalism is consistent with legislative supremacy, but that
modifications are necessary to resolve the ambiguities of intentionalist analysis).
35. Others have suggested a different categorization of systems of interpretation. Profes-
sors Eskridge and Frickey say that the modem "foundationalist" theories of interpretation
have been: 1) intentionalism ("the actual or presumed intent of the legislature enacting the
statute"); 2) purposivism or modified intentionalism ("the actual or presumed purpose of
the statute") and 3) textualism ("the literal commands of the statutory text"). See Eskridge
& Frickey, supra note 18, at 324. They reject these three approaches and propose a
fourth, which they call "practical reasoning." Id. at 345-83. Professor Shreve identifies
three traditional approaches: intentionalism, plain meaning and political interpretation. Gene
R. Shreve, Symmetries of Access in Civil Rights Litigation: Politics, Pragnatismn and Will,
66 IND. L.L 1, 3 (1990). He rejects these approaches and proposes a fourth, which he
calls "pragmatism." Id. at 37.
36. The practical reasoning of Eskridge and Frickey surely fits this definition. See
Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 18, at 383-84 ("We do believe that the Court's approach
to resolving issues of statutory interpretation is largely grounded in practical reasoning,
and thus that the Court's technique is consistent with other twentieth century trends, such
as pragmatism." Id. at 383.) Shreve's pragmatism also fits this definition. See Shreve,
supra note 35, at 37 ("Pragmatism concerns itself with results, with the instrumental ef-
fectiveness and interaction of . . . [intentionalism, plain meaning, and political interpreta-
tion] . . . in particular applications."). Other scholars also emphasize the incorporation of
public values into statutory interpretation to one degree or another. See, e.g., Sunstein,
supra note 20, at 476-93 (suggesting that, to counteract statutory failure, courts should
interpret statutes to take into account "certain general goals, which include, above all, the
effort to promote accountability and deliberation in government, to furnish surrogates when
both are absent, to limit factionalism and self-interested representation, and to further
political equality."); William D. Popkin, The Collaborative Model of Statutory Interpreta-
tion, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 541, 590 (1988) (positing that statutory interpretation is a col-
laborative effort between the legislature and the courts).
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actual purpose of the legislature, or as a judicially-constructed
purpose based on extra-legislative values.
3
Central to the differences among alternative approaches to
statutory interpretation is the meaning and significance they ascribe
to legislative supremacy. Textualists, intentiohialists and public
values advocates, in fact, might agree that Congress has supreme
policymaking authority in the areas in which Article I authorizes
Congress to act. Yet this common starting point conceals radically
different conceptions of legislative supremacy. An expansive con-
ception of legislative supremacy, for example, would preclude
courts construing statutes from relying on any values other than
those endorsed by the enacting legislature. 8 Such a broad concep-
tion of legislative supremacy appears highly deferential to legisla-
tive authority. However, such an expansive conception of legisla-
tive supremacy is too rigid and impractical since it could preclude
judicial policymaking even where the legislature attempted to dele-
gate such authority to the courts.39 It might also prevent courts
from relying on presumptions about legislative policies, even if
legislators would favor courts taking them into account.40 Finally,
a broad conception of legislative supremacy might force courts to
declare statutes unenforceable even if the statutes were only slight-
ly unclear.4' One vision of the narrowly constrained court, con-
37. Under the traditional formulation of the legal process approach, courts turn to the
purpose of the statute when the legislative command is unclear and assume that the legis-
lature had a reasonable purpose in mind. See 1 Wnuim BLACKSTONE COMmENTARmS
60. Blackstone advised:
As to the subject matter, words are always to be understood as having a re-
gard thereto, for that is always supposed to be in the eye of the legislator, and
all his directions to that end . . . .As to the effects and consequences, the rule
is, that where words bear either none, or a very absurd signification, if literally
understood we must a little deviate from the received sense of them.
See also William N. Eskridge, Politics without Romance: Implications of Public Choice
Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REV. 275, 282 (1988) ("The public state-
ments of legislatures ...are clues to the rational consensus produced in the deliberative
process.").
38. Professor Farber suggests a "strong conception" of legislative supremacy that pre-
cludes the judge from considering even noncontroversial values, such as stare decisis,
"unless the enacting legislature has endorsed [the use of] those values." Farber, supra note
1, at 284.
39. See infra text accompanying notes 53-64.
40. For example, a court might be precluded from relying on well-established presump-
tions, such as a presumption against implied repeals of prior statutes or a presumption
that a statute should be interpreted to be constitutional, unless the enacting legislature had
specifically endorsed the principles. See Farber, supra note 1, at 286.
41. See infra text accompanying notes 124-35.
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forming to a strong conception of legislative supremacy, portrays
the court as the "honest agent" of the legislature, obliged to carry
out legislative commands faithfully.
42
The broad conception of legislative supremacy is contrasted
with a very narrow one: courts must not disregard a clear legisla-
tive command that is constitutional, i.e., a command that Congress
has power to make and that does not violate any other provision of
the Constitution.43 However, the court has authority to interpret
the meaning and application of unclear statutes. Thus, unlike the
"honest agent," the court is a "relational agent," with at least some
discretion when dealing with unforeseen contingencies." The fre-
quency with which the legislature's command is unclear makes a
certain amount of judicial discretion inevitable. But how much
judicial discretion can be justified because legislative commands are
unclear? If courts are free to ignore any ambiguous legislative
commands, the weak conception of legislative supremacy would
free courts of any obligation to follow the legislature's
policymaking authority whenever a command is even slightly "un-
clear."
One implication of these radicaliy different meanings of legis-
lative supremacy is that strikingly different modes of interpretation
can still claim fidelity to the legislative supremacy principle. In
fact, few scholars45 and virtually no court opinion ever claims
(openly) to favor violating legislative supremacy.46 While legisla-
tive supremacy is central to interpretation, however, none of the
42. See Easterbrook, 1983 Term, supra note 1, at 60 ("Judges'must be honest agents
of the political branches. They carry out decisions they do not make.").
43. Professor Farber suggests a "weak conception" of legislative supremacy under
which "a judge may not contravene [constitutional] statutory directives." Farber, supra note
1, at 287.
44. See Eskridge, supra note 1, at 326-30. A relational agent is guided primarily by
the objectives of the principal, not by the principal's specific directions. "A relational con-
tract is one that establishes an ongoing relationship between the parties over time; it is
characterized by open-ended clauses requiring all parties to use their 'best efforts' to
accomplish common objectives." Id. at 326 (citations omitted). See also Posner, Legal
Formalism, supra note 1, at 189-90 (elaborating on the concept of an honest agent and
analogizing courts to a platoon commander in battle who has discretion to deal with
unexpected or unspecified contingencies).
45. Professor Dworkin may be an example. Describing an ideal judge, Dworkin writes:
"[The judge] interprets not just the statute's text but its life, the process that begins be-
fore it becomes law and extends far beyond that moment. He aims to make the best he
can of this continuing story, and his interpretation therefore changes as the story devel-
ops." RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPiRE 348 (1986).
46. See infra text accompanying notes 53-71.
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conceptions described above are adequate. A broad conception of
legislative supremacy, precludes policymaking by the courts, risks
severe disruption of the legal system, and undermines legislative
authority by forcing judges to declare all unclear statutes unen-
forceable. A weak conception of legislative supremacy leads to
expansive policymaking by the courts and introduces extensive
reliance on extra-legislative, non-majoritarian values, in the devel-
opment of social policy. A better view of the judiciary's role in
making policy needs a different principle of legislative supremacy,
one that is faithful to the supreme policymaking role of the legisla-
ture, that reflects, to the extent possible, democratically-derived
values, and yet avoids the rigidities and dangers that follow from
precluding judicial policymaking. This conception of legislative
supremacy will have significant implications for statutory interpreta-
tion.
IV. A LEGISLATIVE CONCEPTION OF
LEGISLATVE SUPREMACY
One way to construct a conception of legislative supremacy is
to ask, "how would legislators view legislative supremacy and its
relationship to statutory interpretation?" The policy-makers' authori-
ty to specify how their commands are t6 be interpreted forms a
strong basis for a legislative conception of legislative supremacy. If
legislators, acting within constitutional constraints, have supreme
policymaking authority, they also have supreme authority to decide
how their commands are to be understood. The authority to make
the command implies the authority to specify rules of interpreta-
tion. A legislative conception of legislative supremacy provides one
way to test alternative approaches to interpretation. If a particular
approach to interpretation appears clearly inconsistent with what a
court could reasonably assume legislators would want, skepticism
of the technique rests on solid ground.
It might seem that legislators would favor intentionalism rather
than textualism or public values analysis since intentionalism
claims to be most respectful of legislative intent. However, there
are some competing considerations. Legislators might oppose an
approach that elevated selected nuggets of legislative history, un-
earthed in an "archaeological dig"47 of voluminous historical doc-
47. See William N. Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PENN. L. REV.
1479, 1482 n.12 (1987) (attributing the "archaeological" metaphor to Professor T. Alexan-
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uments, over a statutory text formally approved by the entire legis-
lature. These considerations might lead legislators to favor some
version of textualism. On the other hand, legislators might favor
courts incorporating public values into the interpretive process if
doing so makes statutes more effective over the long term and
avoids forcing repeated reconsideration and elaboration of policy by
the legislature. In short, it is not obvious whether legislators would
choose textualism, intentionalism, public values analysis or some
combination.
An initial problem in devising a legislative conception of
legislative supremacy occurs because the legislature does not com-
municate its general understanding of the Constitution or other
general legal principles. In contrast, the Supreme Court can, and
frequently does, communicate broad principles of legal theory,
including principles of statutory interpretation.48 However, the
Court's inconsistency in applying the principles it announces de-
tracts from the clarity of the message.4 9 Nevertheless, the Court
may communicate principles of interpretation through judicial opin-
ions if it so desires.
Congress, on the other hand, speaks through specific legisla-
tion. The official pronouncements it makes are largely embodied in
the text of statutes and explanatory materials. It periodically enacts
statutes with provisions prescribing specific modes of interpreta-
tion,5° but it rarely makes an express declaration of its general
conception of legislative supremacy or its general preferences re-
garding modes of interpretation. Moreover, even if one Congress
communicated its understanding of legislative supremacy, that con-
der AleinikofO.
48. The Justices have recently engaged in a vigorous and open debate about principles
of interpretation. See, e.g., West Virginia Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 111 S. Ct. 1138,
1148 (1991) (defending their holding that -reasonable attorney's fee" does not include ex-
pert witness fees and construing the language to fit "most logically and most comfortably
into the body of both previously and subsequently enacted law"); Rust v. Sullivan, I11 S.
Ct. 1759, 1767 (1991) (agreeing that the language of the statute at issue was ambiguous,
the Court deferred to the interpretation of the agency responsible for administering); Public
Citizen v. United States Dep't. of Justice, 491 U.S. 440 (1989) (avoiding a literal inter-
pretation of the statutory language in question, the Court sidestepped the constitutional
issue in favor of statutory construction based on congressional intent).
49. There is no consensus on the Court about methods of interpretation. Professor
Eskridge suggests the Court's membership can be divided by general approach to interpre-
tation. See Eskridge, supra note 17, at 1074-76.
50. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 105(b), 105 Stat.
1071, 1075 (1991) (providing rules of construction).
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ception might be difficult to attribute to other Congresses as well.
In short, understanding how legislators view legislative supremacy
is largely a matter of making reasonable inferences, rather than
conducting an historical analysis of legislative statements.
Deciding which inferences are "reasonable" depends on how
we assume legislators view the legislative process and the legis-
lation they enact. In order to avoid an unduly speculative exercise,
interpretative assumptions should be made cautiously. The assump-
tions should be based on a hypothetical neutral legislator who does
not have any particular political ideology (other than a healthy
respect for democracy and the constitutional system). The ideal leg-
islator would not have any specific legislative goals in mind.1
Within these constraints, the following assumptions can be made:
1) legislators want statutes to be effective, that is, they want their
policies to be implemented in the real world and to have an effect
on how society conducts itself; and 2) they want to maximize their
policymaking authority and minimize the policymaking authority of
the courts. This last assumption also means that legislators want
courts to rely to the extent possible on values that the legislature
itself would favor, rather than values derived from other sources.
Similarly, if courts must weigh competing values, legislators want
courts to weigh them in the way preferred by the legislature, rather
than some other way. These assumptions point toward an expansive
conception of legislative supremacy, but one that does not preclude
judicial policymaking.
V. LEGISLATIVE VALUES AND
STATURORY INTERPRETATION
Since legislatures typically do not communicate meaningful
rules of interpretation, a legislative conception of legislative su-
premacy requires courts to make reasonable inferences about rules
of interpretation that legislators prefer. 2 The remainder of this
51. There is a rough analogy to the individuals in Professor Rawls' "original position"
who must decide, in advance of knowing their eventual place in society, rules for distrib-
uting social wealth. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JusTcE 11 (1971). Our hypothetical
legislator must decide, in advance of knowing his policy preferences, rules for interpreting
statutes.
52. See Farber, supra note 1, at 318. Professor Farber suggests that courts "can read
"off-the-rack' rules of interpretation into congressional enactments, provided those rules
would be favored by rational enacting legislators." Id. My argument goes beyond "off-the-
rack" rules of interpretation but, like Professor Farber's suggestion, it is based on assump-
tions about what rational legislators want.
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article deals with a few important aspects of statutory interpretation
from the legislative perspective. Throughout, the argument depends
on the assumption that legislators have two basic values - creat-
ing an effective statutory scheme and maximizing the policymaking
authority of the legislature. Legislators have other values, in partic-
ular, more specific political values, but recognizing these values
requires development of a more and more artificial construct of
legislative "meta-intent." Much can be said about legislative prefer-
ences for rules of interpretation based on the more cautious as-
sumption that legislators have only these two basic values.
A. Judicial Policymaking
If legislators want courts to minimize judicial policymaking,
they must communicate this conception of legislative supremacy
clearly. The necessity of this command might seem obvious at
first, but it is subject to questions. First, the premise that legislators
want courts to minimize policymaking might itself be wrong. Leg-
islators often want courts to engage in policymaking. Legislators
often delegate policymaking authority to the courts or to an admin-
istrative agency rather than resolve the policy problem them-
selves.53 The delegation may be driven by political considerations,
lack of expertise, or lack of time to resolve specific questions.
Whatever the reason, a fair reading of the legislative command
shows a policy of delegating a certain degree of decision-making
authority to the courts.
The legislature delegates policymaking authority to the courts
in a wide range of situations. The delegation may be narrow, as it
was in the development of evidentiary rules, or it may be quite
broad, as in the case of a "common law" statute.54 In the federal
courts, Congress legislates with an assumption that the Federal
Rules of Evidence will be applied.55 However, if no specific rule
53. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 718 (1979) (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring) ("[T]he Court's opinion demonstrates that Congress, at least during the period
of the enactment of the several Titles of the Civil Rights Act tended to rely to a large
extent on the courts to decide whether there should be a private right of action, rather
than determining this question for itself."); Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984) ("[P]erhaps Congress was unable to
forge a coalition on either side of the question, and those on each side decided to take
their chances with the scheme devised by the agency.").
54. See infra text accompanying notes 60-64.
55. The Rules themselves, approved by Congress, state that they apply generally, with
a few specific exceptions. Fed. R. Evid. 101, 1101.
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is codified, legislators expect courts to engage in a certain degree
of judicial policymaking to establish procedures. 6 The Supreme
Court has frequently developed special procedures to carry out
specific statutory schemes. One example is the elaborate array of
procedural devices developed by the Court to implement the civil
rights laws.57 The history of 'special evidentiary rules in civil
rights cases shows that the Court has felt justified engaging in
policymaking in this area." The Court has acted freely to develop
specially tailored evidentiary devices for other statutory schemes as
well.
59
Unlike a delegation to an administrative agency, a delegation
56. Even in the absence of statutory authorization, the Supreme Court has stated the
courts have certain inherent powers to carry out their responsibilities. See, e.g., Roadway
Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 763 (1980) (impose contempt sanctions on counsel);
see also Mediterranean Enters., Inc. v. Sangyong Corp., 708 F.2d 1458, 1465 (9th Cir.
1983) (control and manage court dockets); Ainsworth v. Vasquez, 759 F.Supp. 1467, 1474
(E.D.Cal. 1991) ("The Court finds the proposed hearings to be well within the magistrate
judges discretion under existing authority and practice. Courts possess substantial inherent
powers to control and manage their dockets.").
57. The process for proving employment discrimination in different situations has been
developed in a series of cases decided over two decades. See, e.g., Patterson v. McLean
Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 186-88 (1989) (proving prima facie case of discrimination
and non-pretextual basis for hiring in suits under § 1981); Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc.
v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 645-52 (1989) (establishing prima facie case of discrimination in
disparate impact cases under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); General Bldg.
Contractors Ass'n., Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 391 (1982) (proving intentional
discrimination in suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988)); Fumco Constr. Corp. v. Waters,
438 U.S. 567, 579-80 (1978) (proving non-pretextual basis for hiring in disparate treat-
ment cases under Title VII); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 803
(1973) (proving prima facie case of discriminatory animus under Title VII).
58. The Court has sometimes said that conventional rules of civil litigation are to be
applied in civil rights cases, see Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 253, (1989),
and that the "ultimate" determination of discrimination is not to be treated differently
from other ultimate questions of fact. See United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v.
Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715-16 (1983). However, to facilitate the fact-finding process nec-
essary for determining ultimate liability, the Court has repeatedly developed specially
tailored procedures as the examples, supra note 57, show. See also Watson v. Fort Worth
Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 986 (1988) ("In order to facilitate the orderly consideration
of relevant evidence, we have devised a series of shifting evidentiary burdens that are
'intended progressively to sharpen the inquiry into the elusive factual question of inten-
tional discrimination.'" (citations omitted)). These special procedures have evolved to deal
with the particular problems inherent in proving discrimination, a task the Court recogniz-
es to be "sensitive and difficult." Aikens, 460 U.S. at 716.
59. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 253 (1989) (noting that
when government seeks "unusual coercive action," special evidentiary rules have been
applied in a variety of cases); Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241-42 (1988) (rec-
ognizing evidentiary presumption that fraud on the market causes injury to seller or pur-
chaser of securities).
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of policymaking authority to the courts is usually implied. Yet, the
delegation can be quite broad. Several scholars have suggested that
very general, "open-textured" statutes such as Section 1983, the
Sherman Act6W and the Taft-Hartley Act6' should be viewed as
"common law" statutes, or as statutes requiring judicial
"gap-filling." 62 The broad policymaking authority exercised by the
courts to implement these statutes is similar to the authority they
exercise to establish and develop the common law. Section 1983,
for example, can be viewed as a general tort remedy, which Con-
gress intended the courts to develop as they had developed other
common law tort remedies.63
The broad delegation that follows from "open-textured" stat-
utes does not undercut the claim that legislators want courts to
follow "clear" commands. Statutes that delegate broad
policymaking authority are not clear commands. Instead, they are
directives to the courts to resolve some policy questions within the
policy parameters set out by the legislature. The duty of a court in
these instances consists of identifying the scope of authorization
and ensuring that the court's policy decisions are consistent with
its authorization. No conflict with legislative supremacy exists in
these cases, even if a court engages in broad policymaking. In fact,
a refusal by courts to make policy decisions would constitute a
violation of legislative supremacy because the court's refusal could
undermine the effectiveness of the statute. 4
60. Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, §§ 1-8, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended
at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988)).
61. Labor-Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 62 Stat. 136
(1947) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-87 (1988)).
62. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PAUL P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLIcY 291 (1988) (describ-
ing the Sherman Act as a common law statute which "may be the occasion for indicial
evolution in the common law tradition"); Posner, Legal Formalism, supra note 1, at
209-12 ("The Sherman Act is a standard instance of a statute that is poorly thought
through, that is delivered to the courts in a severely incomplete state, that begs - though
it doesn't actually ask - the courts to do they can to make it reasonable."); Sunstein,
supra note 20, at 421-22 ("courts have inevitably taken the [Sherman] Act as a delegation
of policymaking power").
63. The Court has characterized Section 1983 as a "species of tort liability" in favor
of persons deprived of federally secured rights. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 253
(1978).
64. A court could refuse to make policy decisions on the ground that the legislature
had unconstitutionally delegated its power, but the power of the Congress to ask, even
demand, that courts assist it in making policy is now well-established. See supra note 7
and accompanying text. The non-delegation doctrine may have some vitality. See infra
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B. Legislators' Values and the Effect of Statutes
A second basis for disputing the proposition that legislators
want courts to follow clear commands is that legislators care only
about constituent approval, not about the actual effects of the stat-
utes they enact. Once the legislation is enacted, and the credit for
it claimed, the legislators' goal has been satisfied.65 In the ex-
treme case, legislators might even benefit politically from passing a
statute but benefit personally if the statute is ignored by the
courts. 66 Similarly, they might benefit politically from passing a
statute but suffer politically if it is implemented by the courts.67
This analysis casts doubt on both the basic legislative goals I as-
serted earlier - that legislators want to maximize their
policymaking authority and make their statutes effective. Constitu-
ency approval as a primary value suggests that legislators prefer
prestige, job security and the perquisites of high office to the op-
portunity to shape national policy.
This view of legislators is surely too harsh. Yet, even if it
were true, it does not undercut the claim that legislators want
statutes to be effective. Ultimately, legislators must care about the
actual effects of the statutes they enact because they are held polit-
ically accountable for them.68 Moreover, legislators do not want
text accompanying notes 182-191 (discussing Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v.
American Petroleum Institute, 448 U.S. 607 (1980)). However, the doctrine has only been
applied in the context of a supposedly excessive delegation to an administrative agency,
not to the courts. Alternatively, a court might claim that a statute is so devoid of stan-
dards that it is unconstitutionally vague. This doctrine, applied almost exclusively in the
context of a criminal statute, would be applicable, if ever, only in extreme circumstances.
See infra note 212 and accompanying text.
65. There are competing theories about why legislators do what they do. A single-
minded pursuit of re-election is only one possibility. Some political science literature
suggests a model that is more complex and more sympathetic to legislators. See the dis-
cussion and citations cited in Sunstein, supra note 20, at 448. The point of the argument
in the text is that the assumption that legislators want their statutes to be effective does
*not turn on whether their motives are altruistic or selfish.
66. For example, legislators might want courts to ignore a statute reducing salaries for
Members of Congress.
67. For example, the legislature might make exaggerated claims that a tax reduction
plan will actually raise revenue when they know that, if it is implemented, it will reduce
revenues. Legislators would like to get the credit for the tax reduction without the politi-
cal costs that follow from reduced revenue.
68. For example, even if the courts ignored the salary reduction statute or the tax
reduction statute, the public is not likely to forget the legislature's claims. The public is
likely to remind the legislators of their claims and demand that they try to accomplish the
objectives. On the other hand, if the courts implement the statutes and the effects are
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courts consistently "rescuing" them from bad policy decisions. If
courts routinely ignored or modified clear legislative commands the
role of the legislature would be undermined, perhaps even
trivialized. Even if the public was pleased with the revised policy,
constituents would not give credit for the policy to the legislators.
The legislators' claim that it is important that they be re-elected
would be undermined.
Moreover, when a legislature speaks clearly, it expects its
commands to be followed. This expectation is solidly grounded on
the historical relationship between the legislature and courts since
courts virtually never (openly) ignore a clear command. Even opin-
ions which arguably have ignored clear commands,69 pay homage
to legislative supremacy and claim to be faithful to legislative
intent. Decisions that ignore clear legislative text do so with the
explanation that the text does not reflect legislative intent.7 A
court that openly ignored a clear legislative command would be
viewed as simply "lawless."'" In short, as a general matter, legis-
lators are jealously protective of their policymaking authority. They
exercise it expecting that their policies will be carried out and that
they will be held accountable for the effects of those policies.
VI. WHAT IS THE LEGISLATIVE COMMAND?
A. Introduction
The principle that courts should follow clear legislative com-
mands provides a little help with problems of statutory interpreta-
harmful, the political benefits following passage will quickly be replaced by resentment
toward the actual effects.
69. Some cases are cited frequently as examples of the court ignoring relatively clear
legislative commands. See, e.g., the discussion of Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461
U.S. 574 (1983), where the Court upheld an Internal Revenue Service regulation denying
tax-exempt status to racially discriminatory institutions, in Eskridge, supra note 17, at
1034-36, and the discussion of United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979), where
the Court upheld a voluntary affirmative action program under the Civil Rights Act of
1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VII, §§ 703(a), (d), 78 Stat. 241, 255-56 (1964) (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a), (d) (1988), in Farber, supra note 1, at 302-06.
Nevertheless, the majority opinions in both Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 596-602, and Weber,
443 U.S. at 207, claimed to be carrying out congressional intent. The Court in those
cases was not necessarily carrying out the intent of the enacting Congress, but claiming
that they were.
70. See infra note 110 and accompanying text.
71. Farber, supra note 1, at 293.
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tion, but only a little. Even a weak conception of legislative su-
premacy incorporates the principle that courts' should follow a clear
legislative command.7 2 An initial problem, however, is how to
characterize the legislative command. A textualist would assert that
a command is the statutory text.73 The text determines the inter-
pretation even if the legislative history points clearly toward a
different result.74 The meaning of the words is determined by
their use at the time of enactment.75 The criticisms of textualism
are familiar. Because the words of the text alone can be highly
ambiguous, particularly if the interpreter attempts to give them a
long outdated meaning, a textualist interpretation can be highly
speculative. A court's claim that it is simply carrying out the clear
text of a statute can be a subterfuge for the court furthering its
own political agenda.76
An intentionalist, willing to conduct an inquiry regarding the
legislature's intent, would consider reliable indications of intent,
such as committee reports and other authoritative legislative materi-
als, in addition to the statutory text. The critiques of intentionalism
are also familiar. "Intent" is an artificial construct since the collec-
tive intent of all the members of the legislature is meaningless.'
72. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
73. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
74. See, e.g., Aleinikoff, supra note 20, at, 38 (discussing Justice Scalia's
"anti-intentionalism"); Easterbrook, supra note 33, at 534 (discussing statutory construction
and interpretation).
75. See, e.g., Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 528 (1989). (Scalia,
J., concurring in judgment). In Bock Laundry Scalia wrote:
The meaning of terms on the statute books ought to be determined, not on the
basis of which meaning can be shown to have been understood by a larger
handful of the Members of Congress; but rather on the basis of which meaning
is (1) most in accord with context and ordinary usage, and thus most likely to
have been understood by the whole Congress which voted on the words of the
statute (not to mention the citizens subject to it), and (2) most compatible with
the surrounding body of law into which the provision must be integrated - a
compatibility which, by a benign fiction, we assume Congress always has in
mind. I would not permit any of the historical and legislative material discussed
by the Court, or all of it combined, to lead me to a different result from the
one that these factors suggest.
Id. (emphasis supplied).
76. See Eskridge, supra note 33, at 688 (warning against the use of a clear statement
rule).
77. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Legal Interpretation and the Power of the Judi-
ciary, 7 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 87, 87 (1984) ("The meaning of words is not the
same as the 'intent' of the writers. Often writers have no pertinent intent or have several
intents."); Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REv. 863, 869-70 (1930) (-It
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The search for the legislature's intent, as a whole, may turn out to
be no more than the "archeological excavation of some long-de-
parted historical understanding" with little relevance to current
problems.7" The search for "intent," no matter how exhaustive,
may still fail to resolve the interpretive problem because no clear
intent emerges.
Public values advocates are willing to conduct a broad search
for meaning. The search takes place in an
ever-widening circle of material - the shared conceptions
of how particular words are used at the time a statute is
passed, the historical mischief animating (or prompting) the
passage of a law, legislative intent to solve a specific prob-
lem, more general purposes underlying the statute, and,
finally, the background considerations (such as traditional
social and political values) affecting the legislature's ac-
tion."
Public values advocates may remain (or at least attempt to remain)
within the outer boundaries of intentionalism by advocating that
courts rely on certain values that, although not expressed by the
legislature, are, nevertheless, consistent with the unexpressed intent
of the legislature, or its "meta-intent."8" Alternatively, public val-
ues analysis may abandon intentionalism without expressly advocat-
ing that courts ignore legislative intent by claiming that historical
intent, standing alone, is meaningless" or indeterminate.82
has frequently been declared that the mot approved method [of interpretation] is to dis-
cover the intent of the legislator . . . . On this transparent and absurd fiction it ought not
be necessary to dwell.").
78. Eskridge, supra note 17, at 1072.
79. William D. Popkin, A Common Lawyer on the Supreme Court: The Opinions of
Justice Stevens, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1087, 1139 (1989); see also Shreve, supra note 35, at 9.
80. See, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 1, at 332-33.
81. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 18, at 346. ("Hermeneutics suggests that the
text lacks meaning until it is interpreted . . . .A text . . . is not meaningful 'in itself'
apart from possible interpreters and their historical contexts."); William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Gadamner/Statutory Interpretation, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 609, 664-66 (1990); Popkin, supra
note 36, at 579.
82. See, e.g., JONATHAN CULLER, ON DECONSTRUCTION: THEORY AND CRITICISM AF-
TER STRUCTURAUSM 123-24 (1982) ("Context is boundless in two senses. First, any given
context is open to further description .... [Second] any attempt to codify context can
always be grafted onto the context it sought to describe, yielding a context which escapes
the previous formulation."). For a critique of the indeterminacy thesis, see Lawrence B.
Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma, 54 U. CH. L. REV. 462
(1987).
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B. The Legislative Command and the Legislative Process
A legislative conception of legislative supremacy asks: how do
legislators view legislative commands. What information would
legislators expect courts to consider in construing them? Legislators
would certainly expect courts to begin their inquiry with the legis-
lative text. The enactment process, including the elaborate drafting
and amendment procedures, the limitation of legislature-wide ap-
proval to the formal text, and the necessity of complying with
constitutional requirements to insure validity83 all elevate text to a
special and lofty position.
While the text occupies the central position in the overall legis-
lative statement of policy, the legislative process itself shows that
legislators want courts to consider other reliable indicators of the
legislature's policy. That legislatures spend considerable time and
effort in preparing extra-textual statements, explaining the meaning
of statutory texts, demonstrates that they want courts to consider
them. Legislators prepare these statements not simply to explain
statutory meaning to each other, but to explain it to the courts and
the public. Committee reports are a historically well-established
device for communicating the meaning of statutes.84 Similarly,
floor debates provide an elaborate record of extra-textual state-
ments.85
83. In particular, enactment must comply with the bicameralism requirement of the
U.S. Const. art I, § 1, and the presentment requirement of art. I § 7. See Patterson v.
McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 175 n.1 (1989) (stating that Congress may legislate
only through passage of a bill approved by both Houses and signed by the President).
84. See CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY'S GUIDE TO CONGRESS 412 (3rd ed. 1982) (de-
scribing the contents of the reports as the purposis and scope of the bill, explanations of
committee amendments, proposed changes, etc.); ROBERT GOEHLERT, CONGRESS AND
LAW-MAKING: RESEARCHING THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 412 (1979); NATIONAL ARCHIVES
& RECORDS ADMINISTRATION, GUIDE TO THE RECORDS OF THE UNITED STATES HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES 16 (1989) [hereinafter, GUIDE TO RE-
CORDS]. The report states:
As Congress evolved during the 19th and 20th centuries, increasingly
more of the workload was transferred from the floor of Congress to its com-
mittees and subcommittees. Published records of committee activity include
hearings, both published and unpublished, reports, other documents that commit-
tees thought deserved wider circulation, and staff studies.
85. The Constitution requires only that "[e]ach House shall keep a Journal of its Pro-
ceedings." U.S. Const. art I, § 5 cl. 3. These journals simply record actions taken, they
are not explanations of policy. GUIDE TO RECORDS, supra note 84, at 16. In 1833, Con-
gress authorized what appeared to be a verbatim transcription of proceedings. Id. at 15. In
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Sponsors of bills and amendments routinely introduce their
textual proposals with lengthy explanations, which become part of
the historical record of the enactment process. 6 Where a legisla-
ture does not rely upon committee reports or recorded debate, its
actions suggest legislative support for textudlism" The legislators
themselves have chosen to communicate their legislative commands
principally through the text of statutes. However, where the legisla-
ture formalizes the committee report and debate process, as in the
case of Congress, their actions point in the other direction.8 8 A
legislative conception of legislative supremacy, then, rejects a
textualist approach to interpretation.
A related problem is identifying a legislative conception of
"legislative intent." The concept of the subjective intent of all or a
majority of a legislative body is both non-sensical and mislead-
ing.89 Legislators' extensive use of extra-textual statements shows
that they do not view "legislative intent" as meaningless. But how
do they view it? The legislative process also helps answer this
question.
In the case of any particular statute, some members of the
1968, Congress required that the Congressional Record "shall be substantially a verbatim
report of proceedings" of Congress. 44 U.S.C. § 901 (1988). In March 1978, Congress
provided that remarks not actually delivered on the floor be accompanied by a "bullet" in
the margin. GUIDE TO RECORDS, supra note 84, at 16. While the record of legislative
history can still be misleading (e.g., Members of Congress can edit their remarks and can
circumvent the "bullet" requirement by delivering only the first sentence of their remarks
on the floor), the steps taken by Congress to document its own proceedings are elaborate.
Moreover, the clear trend has been toward more complete documentation, not less.
86. For an example of the effects of these explanations, see the extensive discussion of
the floor statements explaining the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in United Steelworkers of
America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 202-03 (1979) (Justice Brennan's majority opinion dis-
cussing the statements of Senator Humphrey), and 443 U.S. at 236-38 (Justice Rehnquist's
dissenting opinion discussing Senator Humphrey's statements). Although Senator Humphrey
was the floor manager, not the sponsor of the bill, he was the principal spokesperson and
advocate for the bill in the Senate and, thus, played the same role as the sponsor. See
also North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 523-31 (1982) (extensively dis-
cussing the statements of Senator Bayh, sponsor of Title IX of the Education Amend-
ments of 1972).
87. State legislatures vary in the way they record committee action and floor debate
and in the significance that state courts are to accord them. See AMERICAN SOCIETY OF
LEGISLATIVE CLERKS AND SECRETARIES AND THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEG-
ISLATURES, INSIDE THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 63-76 (1985).
88. Both the House and Senate have formal rules regarding committee reports. See
Rule XI(I) of the Standing Rules of the House of Representatives and Rule XXVI(7)(b)
of the Standing Rules of the Senate.
89. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
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legislature will have special responsibility for its development and
passage. These members might be the sponsors of the legislation,
the committee chairmen, the floor managers or all of these. The
other legislators necessarily rely on those members who have spe-
cial responsibility for drafting and explaining statutory language.
Typically, those members who are delegated special responsibility
must attempt to reach compromises on disputed points with leaders
of the opposition. Failing a compromise, leaders on both sides are
responsible for articulating and explaining the meaning of compet-
ing proposals prior to a vote by the entire body.
Members who do not take special responsibility for a statute
have less familiarity with the specific meaning of provisions of the
legislation than the legislative leaders. In fact, the members who
are not specifically responsible for a bill may never have read the
statutory text or committee reports at all.90 Instead, they must rely
on the explanations of the members with special responsibility. 91
Members who are even further removed from the development of a
specific bill may lack familiarity with some of the specific policies
included in the bill. In effect, there are usually a number of cate-
gories or "rings" of legislators, ranging from those in the first ring,
who have special responsibility for passage of or opposition to an
entire bill, to those who become deeply involved in specific aspects
of the bill, to those in the outer rings, who are only generally
familiar with the basic policies and political dynamics of the
bill.' Members less familiar with a bill must have confidence that
legislative leaders are fairly representing to them the nature and
90. There is evidence that legislators outside the committee with jurisdiction over a
bill, or their staff, focus primarily on the report rather than on the text of the bill itself.
WALTER V. OLESZEK, CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURES AND THE POLICY PROCESS 94 (2d ed.
1984). Even when staff aides read the report, the members themselves may not.
91. See Farber, supra note 1, at 290.
92. In the course of enactment of a particular bill, many members of a legislature may
become deeply involved in the development of specific aspects of the bill, for example
through offering amendments. It is not unusual for dozens of amendments to be offered
to a single complex bill. To take a recent example, as the Senate considered the Clean
Air Act Amendments of 1989, S. 1630, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990), 60 different Sena-
tors offered 131 amendments to the bill. See Daily Digest, 136 CONG. REC. Nos. 20-39
(Mar.-Apr. 3, 1990). While it is likely that only some of these Senators were familiar
with the details of the entire bill, each was undoubtedly familiar with his or her own
amendment. See Richard A. Posner, Economics, Politics, and the Reading of Statutes and
the Constitution, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 274-75 (1982) (explaining that if one -as-
sume[s] some unknown fraction of all bills are passed at the behest of politically power-
ful interest groups, it is not so clear that each member of the legislative majority behind
a particular bill has studied the details of the bill he voted for").
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parameters of any compromise and, failing a compromise, the
political interests who support various positions.93
The process of enacting legislation by relying on members with
specialized responsibility suggests that legislators view the legisla-
tive "intent" as the policies represented in the statutory text and
explained by the legislative leaders for any particular bill. In this
sense, legislative "intent" is an objective manifestation of policy.'
One might object that the constitutional scheme does not contem-
plate granting certain members of the legislature relatively greater
influence than others. However, there are strong justifications for
this result. First, the practical difficulties of developing and enact-
ing complex legislation require that certain members have special-
ized responsibility. 95 Second, the members with specialized re-
sponsibility tend to change from bill to bill. Over time, a large
proportion of the legislature will be extensively involved in taking
responsibility for articulating the meaning of statutes.96 Sharing
leadership makes the delegation of specialized responsibility to
individual members more acceptable to the legislature and tends to
93. One argument that legislators will report accurately the terms of the bill, including
any compromises, is that the sponsors will have difficulty reaching deals in the future
unless the compromise is fairly stated. Posner, supra note 92, at 275. A consistent failure
to represent accurately the policies of a bill, or a compromise, would undermine a
legislator's effectiveness and lead to her replacement as a legislative leader. Committee
leaders apparently have built up a reputation of being reliable; the reality seems to be
that legislators depend heavily on them. See Farber, supra note 1, at 290-91; Farber &
Frickey, supra note 22, at 950 (noting that public choice scholarship and "longstanding
political science understandings of committee power" support the presumption that legisla-
tors adopt the intent of committee members on the details of the bill).
94. There seems to be a broad consensus that a search for the meaning of statute
should be a search for an objective manifestation of policy, not the subjective understand-
ing of the enacting legislators. See, e.g., Lawrence H. Tribe, Judicial Interpretation of
Statutes: Three Axioms, 11 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 51, 51 (1988) ("I begin by express-
ing my agreement with Justice Scalia that our search in statutory interpretation, as in
constitutional interpretation, must be not for a subjective, unenacted intent but for an
objective, enacted meaning of a legal text.").
95. See STEVEN S. SMITH & CHRISTOPHER H. DERiNG, COMMITTEES IN CONGRESS
225-27 (1990). The committees provide an avenue for decentralization of decisionmaking
in Congress that is necessary for Congress' well-being as a decisionmaking authority. The
committee system divides issues into reasonable size and scope, providing the opportunity
for specialization. Id. at 225-26. See also Ronald D. Hedlund, Organizational Attributes of
Legislatures: Structure, Rules, Norms, Resources, 9 LEGIs. STUD. Q. 51, 80-81 (1984)
(discussing specialization).
96. For example, during July 1991, nine significant bills passed the Senate. In addition
to the involvement of the Senators who sponsored the bills, a total of 221 amendments
were offered to these bills by 73 different Senators. See Daily Digest, 137 CONG. REC.
Nos. 103-117 (daily eds. July 8, 1991 through July 29, 1991).
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equalize the influence of all members.97
The process of enactment shows that legislators want courts to
consider extra-textual statements in deriving the meaning of a stat-
ute. But what information would legislators want courts to consid-
er? As the interpretive process moves from the text to other indica-
tors of intent - committee reports, statements of sponsors, post-
enactment history, historical context of enactment, the broad legis-
lative purpose - the weight accorded these indicators by courts
changes. Such a process obviously has great potential for arbitrari-
ness and inconsistency.98 Legislators, like courts, are wary of free-
wheeling uses of legislative history. We should assume that legisla-
tors want courts to consider primarily statements that are adopted
by the majority or that represent explanations by legislators with
specialized responsibility for enactment. From the legislative per-
spective, these statements are reliable because the legislature as a
whole has had an opportunity to review and respond to them. 9
Reliable statements certainly include reports by committees with
formal delegated responsibility for legislation. Congress, like any
complex institution, can function efficiently only by dividing tasks
among subgroups and delegating authority to them in specialized
areas.'O These subgroups, the congressional committees, are es-
sential for Congress' formulation and consideration of complex
legislation. One function of the committee system is to prepare
written statements explaining legislation. Committee chairs from the
majority party and ranking members from the minority party are
responsible for preparing reports about legislation that represent the
views of both the majority and minority.' These committee
97. Even so, there is no doubt that some members have more influence than others,
even over the long run. To the extent that this greater influence is based on formal dele-
gation- of authority, e.g., a committee chairmanship, the members of the legislature have
themselves approved the delegation. See SMITH & DEEING, supra note 95, at 119-20,
discussing methods of choosing committee leaders and the influence of leadership posts.
98. See Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the
1981 Supreme Court Tenn, 68 IOWA L. REV. 195, 200-06 (1983) (reflecting on her expe-
rience as a former congressional liaison).
99. See Eskridge, supra note 33, at 681 (arguing that the traditional approach to con-
sideration of legislative history has some legitimacy since legislative history is "created
within the legislative process, and subject to legislative reaction and correction").
100. See supra note 95 and accompanying text. See also WILUAM 3. KEEFE & MoRRIs
S. OGUL, THE AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE PROCESS: CONGRESS AND THE STATES 146-47 (7th
ed. 1989) (discussing the importance of congressional committees as a matter of admin-
istrative necessity stemming from the complexity variation of legislation and the need for
policy specialization).
101. See, e.g., Rule XXVI(7)(b)-(c), Standing Rules of the United States Senate, 102nd
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leaders are accountable to the Congress as a whole. A regular
failure to explain legislation correctly or to misrepresent its mean-
ing would undermine the committee system and presumably result
in a replacement of the committee leaders.
While the legislature as a whole is ordinarily willing to accept
the meaning attributed to legislation by committee leaders, the
legislature relies on a number of additional safeguards of the reli-
ability of these reports. For example, leaders of the opposition are
responsible for reviewing the report of the majority and for calling
attention to any points in the report that conflict with or weaken
the majority's argument. Frequently, during floor debate, opponents
of a bill point to passages in a report that are arguably inconsistent
with the text of the bill or with the sponsor's statements."°e Com-
mittee leaders must defend the report or risk either losing votes or
having the legislation amended on the floor.
Frequently, in order to build a majority, proponents of legisla-
tion will engage in explanatory colloquies negotiated with potential
opponents of a bill to assuage concerns about statements in the
report.10 3 These techniques help insure the reliability of a- report
by allowing legislators to review and respond to the statements in
the report before the floor debate.
There are similar safeguards of reliability in the statements of
sponsors, which are viewed as authoritative and which are suscepti-
ble to attack on the floor by opponents.'" Opponents of legisla-
Congress (requiring each committee to keep a record of committee action and to provide
the minority and individual members the opportunity to include separate views).
102. See, e.g., 135 CONG. REC. S10,768 (1989) ("[Senator Harldn] better read his com-
mittee report, because it says [persons who are HIV positive] are covered.") (statement of
Senator Helms in debate regarding who is covered by the Americans with Disabilities
Act); 135 CONG REC. S10,765-85 (reporting extensive discussion of the definition of "in-
dividuals with disabilities" with frequent reference to committee report).
103. A colloquy negotiated with a potential opponent of legislation has a higher degree
of reliability than a "friendly" colloquy between two supporters of a bill. In the case of
the negotiated colloquy, the potential opponent has challenged the proponent's position and
a revised explanation of policy may be necessary to achieve a majority. For an interesting
example where a key Senator responded to a colloquy of House members when he
watched the House proceedings on television, see Steven F. Ross, Reaganist Realism
Comes to Detroit, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 399, 423 n.136. In contrast, the "friendly" collo-
quy occurs between two supporters of a bill, each of whom has an incentive to extend
the reach of the bill. If other legislators have no practical way to challenge the explana-
tion, it is less reliable. For example, a friendly colloquy may be inserted into the record
without having been read on the floor. See William S. Moorehead, A Congressman Looks
at the Planned Colloquy and Its Effect in the Interpretation of Statutes, 45 A.B.A. J.
1314 (1959).
104. Sponsors' statements traditionally have been accorded weight in statutory interpre-
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tion frequently point to statements by the sponsors to clarify cer-
tain matters or to point out inconsistencies or weaknesses in the
proponents' case for the legislation. Similarly, debates on specific
amendments are highly reliable since leading opponents and propo-
nents of legislation will normally participate in the debate. Of
course, there are times amendments are passed when the normal
safeguards do not hold, e.g., amendments adopted by voice votes
when only a few members of the legislative body are aware of the
amendment.105 However, in these cases, the failure of any safe-
guards accompanies the enactment of the text as well as the legis-
lative history. Thus, the claim that a particular meaning reflects the
views of the legislature as a whole is no stronger for the text than
for the legislative history. In short, legislatures have self-regulatory
procedures for insuring reliability of extra-textual explanations of
statutory text. When these explanatory statements meet Congress's
own standards for insuring reliability, a court has a strong basis for
relying on the statements.
Conversely, legislators would not want courts to rely on state-
ments that are unreliable because the legislature has had no oppor-
tunity to review them. Post-enactment statements by individual
members are the most obvious example,'t 6 but even statements
made prior to enactment, such as statements by individual members
whose opinions are not viewed as authoritative, would be seen as
tation because other legislators view the sponsors as knowledgeable, and because other
legislators rely on the sponsor's explanations of the legislation's policies. ESKRIDGE &
FRICKEY, supra note 62, at 735. In International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local Union No.
474 v. NLRB, 814 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir. 1987), Judge Buckley wrote a forceful concur-
rence arguing that legislative history should be given little weight. Id. at 715-20 (Buckley,
J., concurring). The text addresses one of his more persuasive arguments - that legisla-
tive history should be given little weight if it is "never subjected to the hazard of rebut-
tal." Id. at 717.
105. Congress traditionally delegates authority to review non-controversial amendments to
the "floor managers" of the bill, e.g., the relevant committee chair and ranking member.
If these floor managers, who typically represent both parties and, at least nominally, the
opponents and proponents of the bill, endorse an amendment, it is put to a voice vote
and chamber passage is virtually assured. See, e.g., Church of Scientology v. IRS, 484
U.S. 9, 16-17 (1987), where this process is discussed in connection with an amendment to
the Tax Reform Act of 1976. The Court declined to give a broader meaning to the
amendment than was stated by the sponsor of the amendment on the grounds that, had a
different meaning been intended, floor debate and a roll call vote would have occurred.
Id. at 17.
106. The Court has occasionally given weight to post-enactment statements by individual
members. See, e.g., Bankamerica Corp. v. United States, 462 U.S. 122, 132 (1983) (state-
ment by Representative Patman); North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 531
(1982) (statement by Senator Bayh).
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unreliable by legislators.107 In these cases, the legislature has no
procedure for challenging the accuracy of the statements except in
time-consuming, largely extraneous debate.- To a limited extent,
Congress has adopted a procedure for precluding these unreliable
statements from having weight in the interpretive process." In
general, however, it is impractical for Congress to prevent individu-
al members from making statements that purport to be authorita-
tive, both before or after enactment, or to communicate to the
courts what weight such statements should have. Courts must infer
what weight the legislature as a whole wants them to place on
such statements.
C. The Role of Purpose
Justifying the use of legislative history when the legislature has
clearly attempted to explain the meaning of an ambiguous term in
the statutory text is straightforward. The relevance of broad state-
ments of purpose is more perplexing. A statement of the "purpose"
of the legislation, i.e., the policy objective, is not necessarily tied
to any text. The purpose of a particular statute can be stated very
generally and can reflect a number of objectives that seem to point
in opposite directions. Nevertheless, courts conventionally take
purpose into account in interpreting a textually ambiguous stat-
ute,1°9 and, in some instances, when the text appears clear. 10
107. See North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. at 526-27, for a traditional for-
mulation of the weight to be given statements by individual members. "Although the
statements of one legislator made during debate may not be controlling . . . , Senator
Bayh's remarks, as those of the sponsor of the language ultimately enacted, are an author-
itative guide to the statute's construction." Id. (citations omitted).
108. In 1978 the Government Printing Office, at the direction of the House and Senate,
began using black dots or bullets to mark statements not made in person on the floor.
See supra note 85.
109. A traditional formulation is stated in United States v. Public Util. Comm'n of Cali-
fornia, 345 U.S 295, 315 (1953) (citations omitted):
Where the language and purpose of the questioned statute is clear, courts, of
course, follow the legislative direction in interpretation. Where the words are
ambiguous, the judiciary may properly use the legislative history to reach a
conclusion. And that method of determining congressional purpose is likewise
applicable when the literal words would bring about an end completely at vari-
ance with the purpose of the statute.
110. The Court explained the use of purpose where the text seems unambiguous in
Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982) (citations omitted):
[l]n rare cases the literal application of a statute will produce a result demon-
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How would legislators view the use of purpose in statutory inter-
pretation? In particular, how would legislators view the elevation of
a purpose over a clearly stated text?
The textualist argument that the "words of the statute, and not
the intent of the drafters, are the law" '' would not be convinc-
ing to legislators. Just as any speaker elevates her intended mean-
ing over the literal words she utters, legislators would elevate their
intended meaning over the words of a statute. In the simplest case,
for example, legislators would insist that their policy not be deter-
mined by an obvious mistake in drafting.12 However, legislators
might have a competing concern. To the extent courts felt justified
in ignoring clear legislative text in favor of a purpose the court
had found in the statute, the result might be less respect for legis-
lative intent, not more. Therefore, legislators might gladly accept
occasional enforcement of a drafting error over free-wheeling use
of purpose by courts.
Despite the risks that follow from courts turning to purpose,
there are a number of factors that suggest legislators still want
courts to do so. This may be true, even to the point of elevating
the purpose of legislation over the most obvious meaning of the
statutory text. First, the atmosphere in which legislation is drafted
is often "harried and hurried."".3 In the frequent case of last-
minute compromises, the actual drafting of text may take place in
a highly condensed time period, compared to the lengthy period
during which the legislative history has developed. A realistic view
of the legislative process suggests that the text will frequently not
capture the policy a legislative majority has adopted. Legislators
would insist - "Consider the process!" - if a court was deter-
mined to enforce the literal language of a provision even when the
record of the provision's development pointed clearly toward anoth-
strably at odds with the intentions of its drafters, and those intentions must be
controlling. We have reserved 'some "scope for adopting a restricted rather than
a literal or usual meaning of its words where acceptance of that meaning . . .
would thwart the obvious purpose of the statute.
Ill. Easterbrook, Original Intent, supra note 1, at 65.
112. In fact, courts generally do not implement a statute so as to give effect to an
obvious drafting error. See In re Adamo, 619 F.2d 216, 222 (2d. Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 843 (1980) ("The result of an obvious mistake should not be enforced, particu-
larly when it 'overrides common sense and evident statutory purpose." (quoting United
States v. Brown, 333 U.S. 18, 25 (1948))).
113. See Shine v. Shine, 802 F.2d 583, 587 (Ist Cir. 1986) (commenting on the atmo-
sphere in which the final version of a statute was drafted).
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er meaning.
Second, it is no comfort to legislators that the courts would
adopt the literal meaning of a text over inconsistent statements 6f
purpose on the grounds that the text is more likely to be faithful to
legislative intent.1 4 Courts can be free-wheeling in use of text,
too, perhaps even more than if they are obligated to take extra-
textual statements into account. A suspicion that courts will exploit
the ambiguity of the textual language to advance a particular politi-
cal agenda only heightens the fear.115 Third, a refusal by courts
to examine legislative purpose, or more broadly, any legislative
history, makes legislating very difficult. A refusal of courts to turn
to extra-textual statements of purpose imposes additional costs on
the legislature, forcing legislatures to spend substantial time correct-
ing and clarifying legislation." 6 No speaker wants to spend all
day clarifying her statements because the listener refuses to consid-
er any information that bears on meaning other than the words of
the speaker at that moment.
Even though legislators want courts to look to purpose, they
want courts to be cautious. Broad statements of purpose, like other
extra-textual statements, are more reliable when made by members
with specialized responsibility for enactment. First, they are subject
to challenge and revision since they become part of the enactment
debate. Second, because legislators know that courts will consider
the asserted purpose when they interpret the statute, the legislators
have a strong incentive to challenge or revise asserted purposes
that conflict with the policies they support. A judicially inferred
legislative purpose is inherently less reliable because it is not con-
veyed by express statements. Legislators cannot rebut or review an
unstated, theoretically implied purpose because it does not become
part of the legislative debate surrounding enactment.
D. Post-Enactment Developments
How would legislators want courts to take account of post-
enactment history in interpreting legislative commands - for ex-
ample, the failure of the legislature to reverse an administrative
114. See Aleinikoff, supra note 20, at 31-32.
115. There is no particular reason to suspect that textualism facilitates bending text in
the direction of any political philosophy. The ambiguity of text does suggest that it facili-
tates bending.
116. See Farber, supra note 1, at 291; Farber & Frickey, supra note 22, at 925-37.
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determination? The Supreme Court has frequently considered the
failure of Congress to reverse an administrative determination or
judicial opinion to be an indication that Congress has "acquiesced"
in the interpretation.1 7 From the legislative perspective, there are
three strong arguments against placing too much weight on post-
enactment failures to act. First, no legislation is cost-free. Any time
the legislature devotes to a particular issue necessarily detracts
from attention to be allocated to other issues. A legislator does not
want to be in the position of the speaker held to acquiesce to a
proposition because she failed to object affirmatively. Thus, the
meaning of a failure to reverse an administrative interpretation or
judicial interpretation is at best highly ambiguous.""
Second, interpreting a failure to act as an expression of legisla-
tive policy tends to equate the significance of inaction with the
significance of the original enactment. Yet, the "action" of failing
to reverse an administrative interpretation or court decision requires
far less time and effort than the elaborate procedures Congress has
established to enact legislation, e.g, rules for debate, opportunities
for floor amendments, the need for time-consuming hearings, and
so on." 9 A truncated and unrepresentative process involving a
117. See, e.g., Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 567-68 (1984); North Haven
Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 533-535 (1982); see also Wald, supra note 98, at
205 (expressing the author's discomfort with "[t]he Court's extensive use of postenactment
legislative history").
118. See, e.g., Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 175 n.1 (1989); see
also Easterbrook, supra note 33, at 538-39. But see Johnson v. Transportation Agency,
480 U.S. 616, 672 (1986) (Scalia, J. dissenting). In Johnson, Justice Scalia noted:
The 'complicated check on legislation,* [citing The Federalist No. 62, p. 378
(C. Rossiter ed. 1961)], erected by our Constitution creates an inertia that
makes it impossible to assert with any degree of assurance that congressional
failure to act represents (1) approval of the status quo, as opposed to (2) in-
ability to agree upon how to alter the status quo, (3) unawareness of the status
quo, (4) indifference to the status quo, or even (5) political cowardice.
Id.
119. Often, the only affirmative effort that occurs in the case of a failure to act is that,
once members of Congress become aware of the interpretation, an informal decision is
made, e.g., by the leadership of the relevant committees, that no action is required.
Patterson, 491 U.S. at 202-04 (discussing an amendment by Senator Hruska to what even-
tually became the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86
Stat. 103 (amending Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964)). The Hruska amendment
would have made Title VII the exclusive remedy for employment discrimination, thus
precluding an action based on 42 U.S.C. § 1981, the post-Civil War statute under review
in Patterson. Justice Brennan argued that the failure of Congress to adopt the Hruska
amendment, which was passed by the House but defeated by an even vote in the Senate,
showed congressional agreement with the view that § 1981 reaches private conduct. Id. at
203. Even in the case of -such an extensive affirmative effort, however, the legislative
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few members, which usually underlies failures to act, falls short of
the elaborate and formal process required for enactment. Legislators
would oppose the notion that courts allow a subsequent Congress
to undo or revise prior actions without complying with the formali-
ties required for enactment.
120
Third, legislators want to maximize their own policymaking
authority, not only in relation to the courts but in relation to future
legislatures. 121 From the perspective of any particular Congress,
legislators do not want a future Congress to be able to undo their
work easily."' Similarly, individual legislators are jealous of their
actions in defeating the Hruska amendment fell short of the requirements for adoption of
policy that Congress, or the Constitution, has established.
120. "Congressional inaction cannot amend a duly enacted statute." Patterson, 491 U.S.
at 175 n.1. Congress periodically revises its rules for formal enactment. For example,
from 1917 to 1975, the Senate rules generally provided for cloture by a vote of two-
thirds of the Senators present and voting. In March 1975, the Senate modified the rule to
allow cloture based on a vote of three-fifths of the membership. RANDALL B. REPLEY,
CONGRESS: PROCESS AND POLICY 148 (1983). Rule XXII of the Standing Rules of the
Senate was modified again in 1986 to reduce the period of post-cloture debate from 100
hours to 30 hours. 132 Cong. Rec. S5367-68 (May 6, 1986). while the process of enact-
ment is still cumbersome, these changes show that Congress can make legislating a less
cumbersome task if it wants.
121. No doubt legislators are influenced by the time horizon over which they view
subsequent actions. Legislation approved by a substantial majority is unlikely to be viewed
much differently by a majority of the immediately succeeding Congress because of the
commonality of members. But the Congress of ten years in the future might view things
very differently. Occasionally, Congress incorporates a truncated review process to allow a
future Congress to undo more easily what the current Congress has done. See, e.g., the
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 §§ 101(a)(1)(m)-(n), 100 Stat. 3359,
3370-72 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1324a(m)-(n) (1988)) (providing for expedit-
ed congressional review of policy imposing sanctions on employers depending on findings
of discrimination). The rarity of rules allowing a future Congress to take procedural short-
cuts, however, is evidence that Congress gudrds its policymaking prerogatives from modi-
fication by future Congresses.
122. See Farber, supra note 1, at 308 ("[T]he agenda rules and institutional structures
that create legislative inertia are themselves fundamental to the workings of legisla-
tures . . . . Our legislative process is designed so that laws will outlive the political
coalitions that enact them." (citations omitted)). Courts frequently say that a legislature is
free to reverse a decision if it disagrees with the court's interpretation. The opportunity
for a legislature to correct an erroneous interpretation is a principal rationale for respect-
ing stare decisis in the case of statutory interpretation. See, e.g., Patterson, 491 U.S. at
172-73 (concluding no justification, such as "growth of judicial or further action taken by
Congress" had been shown to overrule precedent). However, it is fair to assume that
legislators place a higher value on enacting a policy consistent with their current values
than in "correcting" an interpretation to ensure it is consistent with the values of an ear-
lier Congress. Thus, a statutory "correction" most clearly shows that a current legislature
disagrees with the policies reflected in the decision, but not necessarily that the interpre-
tation was wrong. The enacting legislature's policy may be just as cloudy to the legisla-
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policymaking authority in relation to other legislators or groups of
legislators in the same legislative body. While they must accept the
authority of the full legislature to undo their work, they generally
do not authorize individual members, or even key committees to
amend a previously enacted statutes.1 3
VII. UNCERTAIN COMMANDS AND
THE ROLE OF PRESUMPTIONS
A. Introduction
Part IV discussed the type of inquiry legislators want courts to
make to determine the legislative command. Following such an
inquiry, legislative supremacy, as it is conceived by the legislature,
requires the court to follow a clear command derived.
However, the notion of a "clear" command remains unclear. No
matter how broad or narrow the inquiry into the meaning of the
legislative command, a great degree of subjectivity is inherent in
deciding when a command is clearly stated. While judges almost
never claim that it is appropriate to ignore a clear legislative com-
mand, they often disagree as to when a command is clear; what is
clear to one judge is unclear to another.
Under a weak conception of legislative supremacy, the exis-
tence of genuine uncertainty might be said to "release" the judge
ture reversing the court's interpretation as it was to the court making the "erroneous"
interpretation. See Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 671-72 (1986) (Scalia,
I., dissenting).
123. If Congress wants to make such a delegation, it can attempt to do so formally. Of
course, its attempts to delegate to a subgroup may be unconstitutional. See, e.g., Immi-
gration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 957-58 (1983) (delegating
legislative veto power to one house of Congress violates bicameralism and presentment
requirements of Constitution). At the time of the Chadha decision, Justice White asserted
that there were about 200 statutes with legislative veto provisions. Id. at 967. The express
nature of these delegations and their anti-majoritarian, indeed unconstitutional, nature weigh
heavily against inferring an implied delegation. In Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437
U.S. 153 (1978), the Court reviewed a claim that construction of the Tellico Dam should
be halted because it threatened extinction of the snail darter, a tiny fish, and therefore
would violate the Endangered Species Act. Id. at 164. One of the arguments against halt-
ing construction was that the Appropriations Committee continued to approve funding for
the Tellico Dam and believed that the dam could be completed without violating federal
law. Id. at 189-91. The majority rejected the funding argument on the grounds that the
committees with substantive jurisdiction would object if their understanding of statutory
policy were undermined by the position of the Appropriations Committee. Id. at 189. A
broader proposition is that the legislature as a whole would object if its position were
undermined by the policy of a single committee.
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from any obligation to the legislative supremacy principle.124 The
case for turning to extra-legislative values is weakest when the
legislative command is clear.125 Identifying when a legislative
command is "unclear" is a crucial part of the interpretive exercise,
but it is hard to define precisely when a command is "unclear."
Perhaps examining the way legislators view unclear commands will
help shed some light on this problem.
B. Indeterminate Legislative Commands
Some scholars would justify broad judicial policymaking on the
grounds that the meaning of statutes are often, perhaps always,
indeterminate. 26 The extreme version of the indeterminacy argu-
ment undermines even the weak conception of legislative suprema-
cy altogether. If legislative commands are inherently unclear, the
obligation of the courts to follow a clear command never arises.
Legislators would, of course, insist that their commands do
have determinative content. Otherwise, their policymaking authority
would be forfeited at the outset. Legislators must rely on a shared
understanding of language and the cultural context of legislative
statements for their statements to have meaning.'27 While judges
will play a role in giving meaning to legislative statements, 2
124. A weak conception of legislative supremacy requires only that courts follow clear
legislative commands. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text. An unclear com-
mand, thus, imposes no obligations on courts at all.
125. See, e.g., supra notes 25-26; Farber, supra note 1, at 292 ("When statutory lan-
guage and legislative intent are unambiguous, courts may not take action to the contrary.
In other words, when legislation clearly embodies a collective legislative understanding,
the court must give way, even if its own view of public policy is quite different.").
126. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
127. See STANLEY E. FISH, IS THERE A TEXT IN T IS CLASS? 304 (1980); Frank H.
Easterbrook, Legal Interpretation and the Power of the Judiciary, 7 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 87, 87 (1984) ("Words have meaning only to the extent there is some agreement
among a community of users of language.").
128. Professor Fish has developed the idea of a community of interpreters and the im-
portance of the shared understanding of language. See Fish, supra note 127, at 304-21.
The question is how much "determined" content exists in the statement leaving the speak-
er. The less "determined" the content, the greater the interpreter's role in giving meaning
to the speaker's statement and vice versa. For contrasting views on the significance of the
interpreter's role, compare Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L.
REV. 739, 739 (1982) (arguing for a middle path, in which the interpreter's role falls
between a "wholly discretionary" and a "wholly mechanical" role) and Stanley E. Fish,
Fish v. Fiss, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1325, 1326, 1328-29 (1984) (arguing that Fiss' "disciplin-
ing rules" designed to guide an interpreter down the middle path, fail because they them-
selves are in need of interpretation and cannot themselves serve as constraining interpreta-
tion).
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legislators would claim that the problem of indeterminacy is man-
ageable. The argument against the claim that legislative commands
are inherently unclear is based on the assumption that the
legislator-speaker and the community of interpreters share the same
general understanding of language and values. If this assumption is
true, then a text can convey the meaning of the speaker. 129 Legis-
lators have a strong claim, by virtue of their representative role in
the political process, that they are within the political main-
streamt" and, thus, that they share the broad values and under-
standing of the community. Moreover, legislators would argue that
judges are typically drawn from the same community and,
therefore, understand the legislators' language and values. This
commonality of values buttresses legislators' insistence that their
commands have determinative content.
C. Subjective Determination of Uncertainty
While legislators would insist that their commands have deter-
minative content, it is not easy for a judicial community to agree
that a command is clear. If two listeners agree on a single most
likely meaning, we know only that they both attach their highest
subjective probability to the same possible meaning. If they agree
that the meaning is "clear," however, the listeners attach a very
low probability to all possible discarded meanings. It is much more
likely that two listeners will be able to agree on a single most
likely meaning than it is likely that they will agree there is no
significant probability attached to any other possible meaning."'
The traditional intentionalist response to uncertainty about the
legislative text is to derive the legislature's intended meaning from
legislative history. An intentionalist judge is not likely to declare
the statute "unclear" without consulting these additional legislative
materials. However, as the interpretive exercise moves from the
text itself to other indicators of intent, such as committee reports
and floor statements, the problem of uncertainty may recur and
129. This proposition is not particularly susceptible to proof one way or the other, but
for a good argument against critics of this assertion, see Lawrence B. Sollom, On the
Indeterninacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 462, 476-84 (1987)
(suggesting that those who attack language for not being up to the task of formulating
rules that have determinate applications rely on flawed philosophical and linguistic argu-
ments).
130. Farber, supra note 1, at 292 n.54.
131. See Appendix, Analysis I.
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actually grow. First, the extra-textual materials themselves may be
unclear. 132 Committee reports can be ambiguous, and reports of
Senate and House committees may be inconsistent. Statements of
individual members of Congress may be ambiguous or inconsistent
with statements of other members. The purpose of the legislature
may be unclear, or there may be conflicting purposes. As the inter-
pretive exercise moves to consider other indicators of intent, the
potential for judges to disagree about whether these other sources
of information produce a "clear" meaning may only increase.
The second reason these extra-textual materials may not solve
the problem of clarity is that there may be disagreement on how
much reliance or weight should be attached to them. A textualist
may place no weight on legislative history. Another judge may
give some to weight to committee reports but little weight to con-
temporaneous statements by individual members or post-enactment
developments, and so on. A simple example illustrates the problem
of judges trying to reach agreement on clarity. Assume that each of
two interpreters has the same minimum threshold for clarity of
eighty percent, i.e., each is willing to state that the meaning is
clear if she believes there is an eighty percent chance that one
meaning is the "true" meaning. Assume also that, after consulting
the statutory text, the judges agree on the most likely meaning but
further agree that this most probable meaning is only seventy per-
cent likely based on the text alone. They decide to consult the
legislative history, including the committee reports and statements
of the sponsors. They then agree that the legislative history sup-
ports the most likely meaning and that there is a ninety percent
probability that they are interpreting the legislative history correct-
ly. Yet, they may still disagree that the interpretation supported by
the legislative history is "clear" if they place a different weight on
these secondary legislative materials. 13
3
Agreeing about uncertainty is difficult because subjective judg-
132. See United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 229-30 (1979)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("In most cases, [lI]egislative history is ... more vague than
the statute we are called upon to interpret." (citing United States v. Public Util. Comm'n,
345 U.S. 295, 320 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring))).
133. For example, if the first judge decides that the legislative history should be given
equal weight with the text, the judge would conclude that there is an 80% chance that
the most likely meaning is true: .5(70%) + .5(90%) - 80%. However, if the second judge
believes that the legislative history deserves only half as much weight as the text, she
may conclude that there is now a 76.7% probability that the most likely meaning is true:
(2/3)(70%) + (1/3)(90%) - 76.7%.
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ments are occurring at several different points in the interpretive
process - assigning probabilities to a meaning based on the text
alone, assigning probabilities to the meaning reflected in the legis-
lative history alone, and assigning some weight to different sources
of information about meaning.13' As the sources relied upon to
determine meaning expand, even more subjective judgments are
involved and the chances for disagreement increase.
The general problem of uncertainty and the significant role of
subjective assessment suggest two propositions. First, there is no
prospect for devising specific rules to guide judges in their deter-
mination of uncertainty. 3 The inherent subjectivity in determin-
ing when a statute, or a statute and its explanatory extraneous ma-
terial, are "clear" means there must be a powerful element of good
faith in judicial interpretation if legislative supremacy is not to be
undermined. Second, there is almost always some degree of uncer-
tainty in the meaning of a legislative command. Legislators would
insist that courts carry out their commands in the face of some
uncertainty about them. If courts insisted on a very high degree of
certainty, few legislative commands would meet the test because
there is some inherent ambiguity in all statutory language and
contextual explanations. Legislative authority would be undermined
by the futile search for absolute certainty. Thus, from the legisla-
tive perspective, a "clear" command need only meet some reason-
able level of certainty. If courts respect legislative supremacy only
when they are "certain" about the legislature's policies - i.e., the
court believes that there is virtually a 100% probability that a
particular meaning is the "true" meaning - legislative supremacy
will be largely undermined.
D. Probability Theory and Unclear Commands
When courts declare that it statute is unclear, they sometimes
134. See, e.g., Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 237-39 (1984). In Regan, a five member
majority of the Supreme Court interpreted the plain language of the Trading with the
Enemy Act to allow the President to bar travel to Cuba. Id. Four dissenters (Justices
Blacknun, Brennan, Marshall and Powell) believed the language was not "plain." Id. at
255 (Blaclanun, J., dissenting). A unanimous court of appeals had found the language was
plain, but they had reached the opposite result of the Supreme Court majority. Wald v.
Regan, 708 F.2d 794, 796 (1st Cir. 1983) (invalidating presidential ban on travel to Cu-
ba), rev'd, 468 U.S. 222 (1984).
135. See Farber, supra note 1, at 291. ([I]t is hard to state a mechanical rule to deter-
mine disobedience. The ultimate question is whether genuine doubt exists about the mean-
ing of the legislative command.").
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mean that, even i f the legislative statements seem reasonably clear,
their inconsistency with prior assumptions about the legislature's
likely policy reduces the probability that the statements' most obvi-
ous meanings are the intended meanings. The concept of inter-
preting statements in light of prior assumptions is a very common
one. For example, it applies in everyday conversation when listen-
ers interpret statements in light of their knowledge of the speaker.
It applies when courts interpret statutory text in light of the actual
purpose of the legislature.'36 It applies when courts interpret a
legislative command in light of prior assumptions about the likeli-
hood that the legislature would adopt a certain policy.'37
It is helpful to use a simple analytical model to see how the
probability of one meaning is related to a prior assumption that a
speaker intends that particular meaning. Bayesian probability theory
provides a method to adjust a prior subjective probability that a
sample observation is drawn from a particular population by taking
into account a sample observation drawn from that population.'38
In the table below, we assume that the most obvious meaning of a
statement points toward meaning A. For example, the statement
might be statutory text alone or the statutory text as explained by
the legislative history. We also assume that there are grounds for a
prior assumption that the legislature would probably intend some-
thing different, meaning B. For example, meaning B might be a
well-established policy that the legislature would presumably fol-
low. The table shows how the probability of meaning A or B
depends upon the clarity or strength of the statement pointing
toward meaning A as well as the strength of the prior assumption
pointing toward meaning B. 139
136. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
137. See infra notes 150-54 and accompanying text.
138. Bayesian reasoning and the formulas for adjusting prior probabilities are discussed
in the Appendix, infra.
139. The table and the probabilities used in calculating the odds shown in each cell are
explained more fully in the Appendix, Analysis III, infra.
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Table I. Posterior Odds of Meaning A or B
Clarity of Statements
Pointing Toward Meaning A
Prior Odds of Weak Moderately Very Clear
Meaning B Clear
Weak Even Moderate Strong for
for A A
Strong Weak for B Even Moderate
for A
Very strong Moderate for B Even Weak for A
Table I can be used to illustrate how the odds that the most
obvious meaning of a legislative command is the intended meaning
should be adjusted in light of prior subjective probabilities about
legislative policy." ° It can also be used to illustrate how the
odds that the most obvious meaning of a statutory text is the in-
tended meaning should be adjusted in light of other indications of
legislative intent, including legislative history and the actual legisla-
tive purpose. A number of general principles emerge from the
table. If a legislative statement points in the same direction as the
prior assumption, the court can have a high degree of confidence
that its prior assumption is correct. A very strong prior assumption
leads to the conclusion that a weak or only moderately strong
statement pointing in the opposite direction should still be interpret-
ed consistently with the prior assumption. Under certain circum-
stances, the resulting odds do not point clearly in either direction,
i.e., the result is ambiguous. The reference to "even" odds in the
table means odds which are less than 2:1 in favor of either mean-
140. The Table shows relationships, not precise quantitative measurements. Changing the
probabilistic assumptions, which are arbitrarily chosen in the first place, shifts the odds
toward A or B in every cell in the matrix. See Appendix, Comments, infra. For example,
using the same formula for revising prior probabilities, the assumption of a super-strong
command, e.g., a sample in which 10 of 10 observations point toward meaning A, leads
to the conclusion that the odds are strong for A even if the prior odds in favor of B are
very strong. Any reasonable set of probabilities, however, produces the same basic rela-
tionships. In some cases, a prior presumption that is sufficiently strong will offset a legis-
lative statement pointing in the opposite direction. A sufficiently strong legislative com-
mand will offset a strong prior presumption. In some situations, the meaning of the legis-
lative command will be ambiguous.
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ing. For example, if the prior odds of B are strong and the legisla-
tive statement pointing toward A is moderately clear, the result is
ambiguous. 41
Basic notions of probabilities are frequently employed by courts
(though, of course, without any explicit reference to probability
theory). The relationship of a weak statement and a strong prior
probability of purpose is reflected in the notion that a very clear
purpose can justify ignoring the most obvious meaning in favor of
a meaning that is consistent with the legislature's actual pur-
pose.142 The relationship of a weak statement and a strong prior
probability about the legislature's likely policy is reflected in the
notion that the legislature will be presumed to have retained a
well-established policy unless it speaks particularly clearly in re-
versing it.'43 The relationship of a strong statement pointing to-
ward one meaning and a very strong prior probability that the
legislature would not intend such a meaning is the underlying
rationale for the idea that a clear text should be ignored if the
resulting policy is "bizarre" or "absurd."'' 4 A legislative concep-
tion of supremacy supports such cohtextualized interpretations be-
cause they avoid erroneous interpretations and distortions of the
legislature's meaning, which would undermine legislators' authority.
Like any speaker, legislators hope listeners will be cautious, i.e.,
take prior probabilities into account, before concluding that a leg-
islature has taken an unexpected or unusual action.
It follows from Table I that courts can make two kinds of
errors using prior probabilities - incorrectly estimating the
141. The actual posterior odds favor B by a ratio of 1.33 to 1. See Appendix, Analysis
III.
142. See Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982) ("[nn rare cases
the literal application of a statute will produce a result demnonstrably at odds with the
intention of its drafters, and those intentions must be controlling."); Commissioner v.
Brown, 380 U.S. 563, 571 (1965) (quoting Helvering v. Hammel, 311 U.S. 504, 510-11
(1941)).
143. See infra notes 150-54 and accompanying text.
144. See Public Citizen v. United States Dep't. of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 470-71 (1989)
Kennedy, J., concurring) ("There is, of course, a legitimate exception to this rule, [that a
clear statute binds courts] which the Court invokes, and with which I have no quarrel
[w]here the plain language of the statute would lead to 'patently absurd
consequences' . . .); United States v. American Trucking Ass'n., Inc., 310 U.S. 534,
542-43 (1940) (rejecting literal definition of "employee" which would lead to absurdly
narrow application of the statute); see also Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S.
504 (1989) (every member of the Court agreeing that a rule of evidence enacted by Con-
gress meant something other than the most obvious meaning of the words of the rule).
The case is discussed infra notes 234-49 and accompanying text.
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strength of the prior probability and incorrectly evaluating the
"strength" or clarity Qf the legislative command. If the prior proba-
bility is so strong that the legislature cannot "draft around" it no
matter how clear the legislative command, the court risks distorting
the legislature's policies.145 As suggested by Table I, a strong
prior assumption should be rejected if the legislative command is
clear enough. When the court rejects a clear command based only
on a weak or moderately strong presumption that the legislature
would act differently, the court abandons the effort to advance
legislative policies and substitutes its own policies in their place.
E. The Role of Presumptions
Judicial reliance on presumptions is analogous to the use of
prior probabilities. Use of presumptions can be consistent with
legislative supremacy by reducing the risk of erroneous interpreta-
tions. However, some typical presumptions are consistent with
legislative supremacy; some are not. From the legislative perspec-
tive, one of the most justifiable uses of presumptions is that the
legislature is likely to continue a well-established policy. For exam-
ple, the court may presume that Congress would not preempt state
law, 146 create an antitrust exemption, 47  or provide that support
145. For example, the Court in Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361 (1974), interpreted a
1970 amendment to the Veterans' Benefits Act of 1957 (codified at 38 U.S.C. § 211(a)
(1988)). The Court found that the amendment did not preclude judicial review of
veterans' disability cases despite the fact that the language of the amendment seemed to
convey a policy clearly precluding review. "[The] decisions of the Administrator on any
question of law or fact concerning a claim for benefits or payments under any law ad-
ministered by the Veterans' Administration shall be final and conclusive and no...
court of the United States shall have power or jurisdiction to review any such decision."
Id. at 369. Nevertheless, the Court relied on a presumption that Congress would not pre-
clude review to conclude that the legislative command was ambiguous. Id. at 373. Con-
gress had not provided the "clear and convincing" evidence necessary to reverse this
presumption. Id.
An alternative rationale for the decision was that such an interpretation might be
required in order to preserve the constitutionality of the statute. Id. at 373. However, the
Court has never decided whether Congress may constitutionally preclude all judicial review
of administrative actions. See GLEN 0. ROBINSON ET.AL., THE ADMINISTRATIVE PRoCEss
241 (3d ed. 1986).
146. See Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981); Ray v. Atlantic Richfield
Co., 435 U.S. 151, 157 (1978) ("startling] with the assumption that the historic police
powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the
clear and manifest purpose of Congress"); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218,
230 (1947).
147. See United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l. Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 350 (1962) (enjoining
the proposed consolidation of appellee banks since the consolidation was in violation of §
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payments are dischargeable in bankruptcy.1 48 The traditional judi-
cial use of presumptions in these situations is to interpret a statute
to be consistent with an established policy unless the legislative
command is very clear in reversing it.
149
To the extent that these presumptions are based on the likeli-
hood that the legislature will continue a well-established policy, a
legislative supremacy justification for reliance on these presump-
tions stems from the general problem of uncertain legislative com-
mands. Just as any speaker wants a listener to use certain prior as-
sumptions to avoid an erroneous interpretation, legislators want
courts to take into account "customary" or "established" policy in
interpreting a command. Thus, the use of a presumption about
likely legislative policy must be grounded on some pattern of legis-
lative actions well enough established to indicate that the legisla-
ture is unlikely to change it.t15 Such an assumption may be justi-
fied in particular cases because legislative action is typically "con-
servative." It adjusts social policies incrementally and in discrete areas.'
7 of the Clayton Act); California v. Federal Power Comm'n, 369 U.S. 482, 485 (1962)
("Immunity from the antitrust laws is not rightly implied.").
148. See Shine v. Shine, 802 F.2d 583, 588 (1st Cir. 1986) (holding that support obli-
gations are not dischargeable in bankruptcy).
149. See, e.g., Philadelphia Nat'l. Bank, 374 U.S. at 350-51 ("Repeals of the antitrust
laws by implication from a regulatory statute are strongly disfavored, and have only been
found in cases of plain repugnancy between the antitrust and regulatory provisions."); see
also United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971), (assuming Congress would not
disturb the federal-state balance unless "Congress conveys its purpose clearly). The Court
explained in Bass, "In traditionally sensitive areas, such as legislation affecting the federal
balance, the requirement of clear statement assures that the legislature has in fact faced,
and intended to bring into issue, the critical matters involved in the judicial decision." Id.
(citations omitted).
150. A more generic traditional presumption is that legislators do not often enact "ab-
surd" or "bizarre" policy. See Public Citizen v. United States Dep't. of Justice, 491 U.S.
440, 470 (1989) ("Where the plain language of the statute would lead to 'patently absurd
consequences' . . . that 'Congress could not possibly have intended' . . . we need not
apply the language in such a fashion. When used in a proper manner, this narrow excep-
tion to our normal rule of statutory construction does not intrude upon the lawmaking
powers of Congress, but rather demonstrates a respect for a coequal Legislative Branch,
which we assume would not act in an absurd way." (Kennedy, J., concurring in
judgment) (citations omitted)). Even if one has a harsh view of legislators, this modest
assumption seems fair enough.
151. See WILLrAM J. KEEFE & MORRis S. OGUL, THE AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE PROCESS
375 (1989) ("T]he inherent complexity of some subjects defies exhaustive statutory treat-
ment."); DUANE LOCKHARD, THE PERVERTED PRIoRITms OF AMERICAN PoLmCs 123
(1971) ("Congress, through its formal rules and its informal practices, is an institution
devoted inordinately to the prevention of action."); cf. Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co.,
490 U.S. 504, 521 (1989) ("A party contending that legislative action changed settled law
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F. Presumptions that Favor Legislative Authority
Certain other presumptions are consistent with a legislative
conception of legislative supremacy because they tend to expand,
rather than contract, legislative authority. This notion provides a
legislative supremacy rationale for several non-controversial pre-
sumptions. For example, legislators want courts to interpret a
statute in a way that makes it constitutional.'52 If a court, faced
with two possible interpretations, chooses the one that results in
striking down the statute, the legislature's policies become com-
pletely ineffective. Similarly, legislators want courts to presume
that previously enacted statutes are not repealed unless the legis-
lative command to do so is clear. '53 A court that is too quick to
find an implied repeal limits legislative authority exercised in en-
acting the prior statute. Similarly, legislators want courts to pre-
serve as much of a statutory scheme as possible, even if one sec-
tion is held unconstitutional, unless the legislature intends that the
whole statute be voided."54 Preserving a part of the statutory
scheme allows some of the legislature's policies to become effec-
tive.
G. Presumptions as Rules For Interpreting Language
Sometimes courts rely on presumptions that take the form of
rules for interpreting language. These may amount to formulas for
interpreting words in statutory text, as in the case of the hodge-
podge of maxims of interpretation. '55 For example, the principle
"expressio unius est exclusio alterius" holds that a statutory provi-
sion referring to a series of specific things is intended to exclude
has the burden of showing that the legislature intended such a change.- (citations omit-
ted)).
152. This is the traditional presumption. See e.g., United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S.
612, 618 (1954); United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 45-6 (1952); Screws v. United
States, 325 U.S. 91, 98 (1945).
153. This is the traditional presumption. See, e.g., Jones v. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409-10,
416-17 n.20 (1968); Posadas v. National City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 503 (1936) ("The
cardinal rule is that repeals by implication are not favored.").
154. See Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 684 (1987) (-Unless it is evident
that the Legislature would not have enacted those provisions which are within its power,
independently of that which is not, the invalid part may be dropped if what is left is
fully operative as law.").
155. For a discussion of the canons of interpretation, see ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra
note 62, at 639-646.
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alternatives not listed.1 56 To the extent that the maxims of inter-
pretation are simply formal statements of common sense devices
for understanding language, they may be helpful. Moreover, they
can be consistent with legislative supremacy since they reduce the
risk of erroneous interpretations. The problem is that the maxims
of interpretation may have little relationship to actual legislative
practice in drafting statutes.157 If the legislature's actual behavior
is not really consistent with such shorthand formulations, they
provide no help and can even be misleading.
H. Presumptions Based on Judicial Policy
Some policy-based presumptions have little or no relationship
to prior legislative actions. Instead, they are justified as advancing
what the court considers important extra-legislative policy. For
example, the presumption that Congress has not abrogated state
immunity is based on notions of federalism, the policy of the Elev-
enth Amendment and the special role of the states in the constitu-
tional system.158 Such a presumption has the same practical effect
on interpretation as a presumption based on a pattern of legislative
actions. The court assumes that the legislature acted consistently
with the presumption unless the legislature speaks clearly.1 59
Another example is the rule of lenity, which can operate as a
judicial presumption that criminal statutes should be interpreted
narrowly.' 60 Again, it operates in the same way as other pre-
156. 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §
47.23, at 194 (4th ed. 1984); ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra note 62, at 641.
157. See, e.g., National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672, 676 (D.C. Cir.
1973) ("This maxim is increasingly considered unreliable ... for it stands on the faulty
premise that all possible alternative or supplemental provisions were necessarily considered
and rejected by the legislative draftsmen." (citations omitted)).
158. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242-43 (1985) (holding that
in order to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment, Congress must express its intention to do
so in unmistakable language in the statute itself and discussing the reasons underlying this
requirement); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99 (1984) ("Our
reluctance to infer that a State's immunity from suit in the federal courts has been negat-
ed stems from recognition of the vital role of the doctrine of sovereign immunity in our
federal system.").
159. See, e.g., Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 242 ("[The requirement is] well established in
our cases ... that Congress unequivocally express its intention to abrogate the Eleventh
Amendment bar to suits against the States in federal court." (citations omitted)).
160. See McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 359-60 (1987) ("The court has often
stated that when there are two rational readings of a criminal statute, one harsher than the
other, we are able to choose the harsher only when Congress has spoken in clear and
definite language."); United States v. Campos-Serrano, 404 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1971) (when
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sumptions, forcing Congress to speak particularly clearly.'61 There
are a host of similar policy-related presumptions. 62
A similar principle holds that courts should interpret a statute
so that it does not "approach the limits" of Constitutional authority.
This notion can have very different meanings. One non-controver-
sial construction of this rule suggests that a court faced with two
possible interpretations of a statute, one of which would result in
statute being declared unconstitutional, will adopt the interpretation
that renders the statute constitutional. 163 This rule of interpretation
is consistent with a legislative conception of legislative supremacy
because it preserves the effectiveness of the statute. 164
A very different construction of this principle, however, is that
a court will avoid an interpretation that borders on the outer reach-
es of Congress's constitutional authority even if the statute is con-
stitutional. 65 It is difficult, perhaps impossible, to reconcile this
second meaning with a legislative conception of legislative suprem-
acy."6 Sometimes the Court speaks in terms similar to those used
interpreting criminal statutes, the purpose of the statute must be considered in order to
place limits on the actual words of the statute); Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S. 169,
177-78 (1958) (stating that when neither the wording of the statute nor its legislative his-
tory points clearly to one of two possible meanings, the court applies a policy of lenity);
Eskridge, supra note 17, at 1029-30 (discussing the presumption created by the rule of
lenity that criminal statutes should be interpreted to avoid constitutional questions, and in
general, should be narrowly construed).
161. "[W]hen choice has to be made between two readings of what conduct Congress
has made a crime, it is appropriate, before we choose the harsher alternative, to require
that Congress should have spoken in language that is clear and definite." United States v.
Universal C.LT. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 221-22 (1952). See also Lewis v. United
States, 445 U.S. 55, 65 (1980) (stating that the touchstone of the principle of lenity is
statutory ambiguity).
162. See ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra note 62, at 655-58 (noting many other specific
policy presumptions, including the those against finding that Congress violated internation-
al law, withdrew all remedies or judicial avenues, or intended to unnecessarily intrude in
traditional state responsibilities).
163. Justice Marshall made the original statement of the principle in Murray v. Schoo-
ner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
164. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
165. See Eskridge, supra note 17, at 1021-22.
166. The rule has its critics. See, e.g., HENRY J. FRIENDLY, BENCHMARKS 211 (1967)
(arguing that despite the backing of many eminent Justices, including Holmes, Taft, Bran-
deis, Hughes and Frankfurter, the rule has "almost as many dangers as advantages" and is
"one of those rules that courts apply when they want and conveniently forget when they
don't"); Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation - in the Classroom and in the Court-
room, 50 U. CM. L. REv. 800, 816 (1983) (-The practical effect of interpreting statutes
to avoid raising constitutional questions is ... to enlarge the already vast reach of con-
stitutional prohibition beyond even the most extravagant modern interpretation of the Con-
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with other policy-based presumptions. Congress must speak clearly
if the statute is to be interpreted in a way that "gives rise to seri-
ous constitutional questions."1 67 The Court assumes that Congress
did not intend to enact a policy that encroaches upon constitution-
ally protected rights in the absence of a clearly expressed "affir-
mative intention." 16' This analysis ignores the plausible, even
likely, possibility that Congress intended to exercise the full reach
of its authority, thus pressing against the "limits" of the Constitu-
tion. If there were a well-established congressional policy of avoid-
ing legislation that bordered on constitutional infringement, such a
presumption might be justified on the grounds that it avoided erro-
neous interpretations. In the cases where this presumption has been
applied, however, it makes little sense to say that there was a well-
established policy of any kind.
1 69
One public values justification for narrowly construing statutes
that "approach the limits" of the Constitution is to facilitate a
dialogue between the courts and the legislature regarding the
Court's understanding of constitutional parameters. 71 In effect,
stitution . . . ").
167. NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490, 501 (1979); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S.
22, 62 (1932) (citing "cardinal principle" to avoid statutory construction which would ren-
der act constitutionally invalid).
168. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. at 501 ("The absence of an 'affirmative intention of the
Congress clearly expressed' fortifies our conclusion that Congress did not contemplate that
the Board would require church-operated schools to grant recognition to unions as bar-
gaining agents for their teachers."); see also Rust v. Sullivan, III S. Ct. 1759, 1778
(1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (positing that a statute barring use of federal funds for
abortion counseling should have been construed to avoid difficult First Amendment issues).
169. It is difficult to claim that there is a well-established policy of congressional con-
cern about pressing against the limits of its authority when Congress does not seem to be
concerned by such a policy very often. The more frequently Congress legislates to the
limits of its authority, the weaker is the argument that there is any well-established poli-
cy. The Court has frequently identified statutes that press against the limits of the First
Amendment. See cases cited supra note 167; see also Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Flor-
ida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trade Council, 485 U.S. 568, 574 (1988) (construing the
National Labor Relations Act narrowly to avoid considering whether prohibition against
handbilling by union workers would violate First Amendment). The presumption that po-
tentially unconstitutional statutory constructions should be avoided has also been applied in
other contexts. See United States v. Security Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 82 (1982) (inter-
preting Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 narrowly to avoid retroactive application of the
law and possible violation of the Takings Clause); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 129
(1958) (avoiding Constitutional questions under Fifth Amendment by narrowly interpreting
authority granted Secretary of State to prohibit foreign travel).
170. See Eskridge, supra note 17, at 1020-22 ("Public values analysis suggests more
substantive rationales for the meta-rule: The [sic] Court should assume that Congress is
sensitive to constitutional concerns and presumably would not pass an unconstitutional
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the argument views the Court as teacher and Congress as the (in-
voluntary) student. While the Court has a legitimate interest in
communicating constitutional principles, it is not authorized by
Article ImI to limit Congress's Article I power simply to teach
Congress a lesson. This rationale is, therefore, unconvincing.
Another possible way to reconcile the rule with legislative
supremacy is to say that the rule advances the values of legislators
themselves. For example, it can be argued that legislators, like
other citizens, value basic principles such as federalism, participa-
tion in the political process, stability in the legal system, and clear
notice of criminal offenses. Thus legislators may be presumed to
want courts to proceed from the premise that statutes do not con-
flict with these broader values, even if they are not expressed in
connection with specific legislation. Incorporating these presump-
tions into statutory interpretation, then, is consistent with
legislators' "meta-intent." Public values analysis sometimes pro-
ceeds this way, perhaps in an effort to avoid an open break with
legislative supremacy."'
Identifying legislators' unexpressed values has an intrinsic
speculative quality (as this article shows). Cautious assumptions
underlie the argument here - legislators want their statutes to
become effective and they are protective of their own policymaking
authority. One can extend the argument about legislative "meta-
intent" much further, of course, but it quickly requires even more
speculative assumptions about legislators' particular political values.
Moreover, even if we could identify values that seem to command
a near consensus, such as stability of the legal system, promotion
of equality and enhancement of individual liberty, a number of
these values often conflict in any individual case. Thus, construct-
ing a legislative "meta-intent" that includes particular political
values poses an increasing risk of simply incorporating judicial
values. The weakness of public values analysis - that courts can
then justify incorporating their own values" - emerges in the
form of an artificial construct of legislative meta-intent. From the
statute; by narrowly construing statutes venturing close to the constitutional periphery, the
Court can signal its concerns to Congress . . . . When Congress fails to proceed in a
manner cognizant and protective of such fundamental values, the Court will give the
statute a narrowing interpretation, leaving it to Congress to rethink the isstfe.").
171. See Eskridge, supra note 17, at 1065 (stating that public value presumptions can
operate as "tiebreakers" in close cases where there are equally good textual and legislative
history arguments for different interpretations).
172. See supra notes 17-30 and accompanying text.
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legislative perspective, then, judicial reliance on policy-based pre-
sumptions is much more easily reconciled with legislative suprema-
cy when they reduce the risk of erroneous interpretations or they
expand legislative authority.
The justification for a rule of interpretation that avoids difficult
constitutional questions ultimately rises or falls based on a judicial
value. By avoiding difficult questions, the court can more confi-
dently, and more easily, reach a narrower ground of decision. First,
the court has less chance of making a mistake. Second, even
though there is still a chance of error, the stakes are corresponding-
ly smaller. Yet, such a rule does not advance any legislative value
and it can be used to disregard a reasonably clear legislative com-
mand. 7 3 Hence, legislative conception of legislative supremacy
requires courts to implement clear legislative commands, even if
the policies they convey are close to the limits of legislative au-
thority.
I. Some Applications of Presumptions
It is useful to see how courts use presumptions to both inter-
pret legislative commands and, in particular, to adjust the probabili-
ty that the most obvious meaning of the legislative command is the
intended one. For example, the statute reviewed in United States v.
Albertini, 74 made it unlawful for a person to enter a military
base after having been ordered not to reenter by an officer in
charge.175 An officer ordered Albertini not to reenter a base be-
cause he and a friend had destroyed government property on the
base on a previous occasion. Nine years after the order, he reen-
tered the base during an annual open house and took part in a
peaceful demonstration. Albertini was charged with and convicted
of violating the statute barring reentry. The Court affirmed the
conviction. 171
As I argued above, legislators want courts to do their best to
deal with the general problem of uncertain commands by taking
appropriate presumptions into account. In this case, the Court was
173. The dissent complained of this result in NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490,
511 (1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting), arguing that the majority, in avoiding the constitu-
tional question, had adopted a reading that was not "fairly possible."
174. 472 U.S. 675 (1985).
175. Id. at 677.
176. Id. at 691.
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faced with a relatively clear command criminalizing reentry. How-
ever, the most obvious meaning suggested may still be incorrect.
The case might be analyzed so as to conclude that interpreting the
statute to allow Albertini's prosecution would violate an established
congressional policy of protecting freedom of speech."V A court
might be justified, therefore, in relying on a prior presumption that
Congress would retain this policy. In order to test the confidence a
court should have in the most obvious meaning of the command
- to allow prosecution - the court must evaluate the strength or
clarity of the command and the strength of the presumption. Reli-
ance on a presumption in favor of free speech might be enough to
overcome a fairly clear statutory text pointing toward barring reen-
try.
There are two problems with this analysis. First, it is possible
to argue that another well-established policy - granting broad
discretion to the military to control its own facilities - points in
the other direction. Which presumption should be given more
weight? 78 Second, even if a general policy in favor of free
speech or a general policy in favor of discretion to the military
could be said to be well-established, neither might apply in this
particular case. There simply is no well-established congressional
policy addressing this unique fact situation. The problem is not so
much a clash of established policies, but the absence of any estab-
lished policy under the circumstances. 179
Albertini, thus, fits the category of cases in which there is no
(or at most a weak) presumption in favor of a policy favoring
freedom of speech and a clear command pointing in the other
direction. 80 As shown in Table I, the posterior odds are at least
177. There are other arguments against allowing the prosecution. First, it might be in-
consistent with the rule of lenity. Second, interpreting, the statute to allow a prosecution
might violate the principle of avoiding difficult constitutional questions. Eskridge, supra
note 17, at 1074.
178. A public values analysis confronts an analogous problem in the Albertini scenario.
Professor Eskridge points out that "judicial deference to executive decisions on national
security matters might be said to be a public value itself" in competition with the value
of peaceful protest. Eskridge, supra note 17, at 1078.
179. A public values analysis reaches the same dead end. Even if there is both a public
value of preserving free speech and a public value in favor of discretion for military
commanders, it is difficult to make out any established public value regarding the discre-
tion of military commanders to limit peaceful protest on military installations. But see id.
(arguing that Albertini was decided by pitting two competing public values, free speech
and military discretion, against one another).
180. See Albertini, 472 U.S. at 689 (allowing speech to be impinged if the burden is
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moderately good that the most obvious meaning of the legislative
command is the correct one. In the absence of any strong reason to
believe that the most obvious meaning of the statute is not correct,
the odds are that the obvious meaning is the correct one. This is,
in fact, the reasoning Justice O'Connor expounded in reaching the
conclusion that Albertini's conviction should be upheld.""
In Industrial Union Department AFL-CIO v. American Petro-
leum Institute ("API"), 18 2 the statute at issue required the Sec-
retary of Labor to promulgate standards for exposure to toxic mate-
rials "which most adequately assures, to the extent feasible, on the
basis of the best available evidence, that no employee suffer mate-
rial impairment of health or functional capacity . *.".., The
Secretary was able to conclude that there was a causal connection
between benzene and leukemia.' 4 Because the secretary could
not quantify the risk of any specific exposure level, however,
therefore, the Secretary set a standard as low as technologically
possible without threatening the "'financial welfare of the affected
firms or the general economy."" 5 On pre-enforcement review,
the Court of Appeals "held that the secretary was under a duty to
determine wherther the benefits expected from -the new standard
bore a reasonable relationship to the costs that it imposed."'
86
The Supreme Court majority found such a cost-benefit analysis
unnecessary in this case because no threshold determination of the
necessity of the regulation had been made and the Court rejected a
construction of the statute that would have given the Secretary
"power to impose enormous costs that might produce little, if any
discernible benefit" 18 7
incidental and the regulation is neutral and "promotes a substantial governmental inter-
est . . . ."). The Albertini Court found not only that the statutory text was" clear, but the
legislative history, including the relevant committee reports and floor debate, were consis-
tent with the most obvious meaning of the text. Id. at 681-82.
181. Id. at 680 ("Proper respect for [congressional] powers implies that '[s]tatutory con-
struction must begin with the language employed by Congress and the assumption that the
ordinary meaning of that language accurately expresses the legislative purpose." (citations
omitted)). The Court also rejected the argument that the statute should be construed to
avoid difficult constitutional questions because this "interpretative canon is not a license
for the judiciary to rewrite language enacted by the legislature." Id. (citations omitted).
182. 448 U.S. 607 (1980).
183. Id. at 612 (citations omitted).
184. Id. at 618-19.
185. See id. at 619, 637 (quoting 43 Fed. Reg. 5939 (1978)).
186. Id. at 614.
187. Id. at 615, 645.
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A legal process approach to analyzing the Court's decision in
API would explain that the Court assumed Congress' purpose must
be "reasonable" and that it would be simply unreasonable to not
balance the costs imposed on an industry against the gains in safe-
ty."' Yet, the statute itself provided a clear statement that the
Secretary was to set a standard that minimized risk "to the extent
feasible.' ' 8 9 One could argue that precluding the administrative
agency from balancing risk and costs to the industry is wrong-
headed legislative policy and, ultimately, more harmful to workers
than a standard based on weighing costs and benefits. Nevertheless,
the legislative command seems clear.
An approach to interpretation that is more consistent with legis-
lative supremacy assesses whether or not there a basis exists for
presuming that Congress would actually implement such a policy,
and then to adjust it in light of the clarity of the command. As in
Albertini, it is difficult to claim that there is any well-established
policy that would favor balancing costs to industry and safety.
Moreover, a policy to bar balancing is not "absurd" or "bizarre" in
the sense in which these terms have traditionally been used."9
Thus, a presumption that Congress would not intend to force such
high costs on an industry is weak at best. The text of the statute in
API was reasonably clear though not completely unambiguous.
Moreover, reliable legislative history showed that minimizing risk
188. Justice Stevens argued for the majority that another more general provision of the
statute required some form of cost-benefit analysis before any standard was promulgated.
Id. at 643-44. This argument would have been more convincing if the specific provision
regarding exposure levels had endorsed this analysis. In the end, the majority relied on
their own interpretation of how a reasonable Congress would act. "In the absence of a
clear mandate in the Act, it is unreasonable to assume that Congress intended to give the
Secretary the unprecedented power over American industry that would result from the
Government's view of [the provisions]." Id. at 645.
189. See supra text accompanying note 183.
190. The majority found the government's construction of the statute incorrect because it
would have made such a "'sweeping delegation of legislative power' that it might be
unconstitutional under the [non-delegation doctrine stated in] A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp.
v. United States [and] Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan." 448 U.S. at 646 (citations omitted).
According to the majority, "[a] construction of the statute that avoids this kind of open-
ended grant should certainly be favored." Id. Avoiding an interpretation that would result
in declaring the statute unconstitutional is consistent with a legislative conception of legis-
lative supremacy. See supra note 152 and accompanying text. However, it is difficult to
reconcile the claim that such an interpretation would constitute an unconstitutional delega-
tion with the statute's command since a requirement that the Secretary minimize risk
grants less discretion than a requirement that the Secretary balance the risks against costs
to the industry. Congress might well have wanted to confine, rather than broaden, the
Secretary's discretion by imposing such a standard.
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was precisely the legislature's goal."91 Overall, the strength of the
command probably deserved to be in the clear category. As reflect-
ed Table I, a weak presumption and a moderately clear command
pointing in the opposite direction leads to a moderately strong
conclusion that the most obvious meaning of the legislative state-
ments reflected Congress's actual intent.
The use of presumptions is helpful in determining when a
statute should be interpreted to authorize an implied private right
of action." 2 The Court has taken different approaches in address-
ing this problem. In J.L Case Co. v. Borak, a93 the Court recog-
nized an implied private right of action to enforce section 14(a) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.94 The Court reasoned that
private enforcement would supplement the SEC's enforcement au-
thority. 9 Therefore, recognizing a private cause of action could
only further the congressional purpose of enacting a strong stat-
ute. 96 In effect, the Court equated stronger remedies with a more
effective statute. The Court weakened this strong presumption in
favor of an implied right of action in Cort v. Ash, 19 7 where it
adopted a four-part test for determining whether Congress "intend-
ed" that private parties could enforce the statute. 98 Although Jus-
191. In particular, the legislative history reflected a recognition that the Secretary might
not be certain which substances were harmful. See 448 U.S. at 691-95 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). To mitigate this concern, the statute required that the standard be as low as
"feasible." See id. at 693-94.
192. The Court has recognized an implied private right of action in numerous opinions.
Perhaps the most prominent examples involve civil rights decisions, see, e.g., Cannon v.
University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979) (recognizing private right of action under
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, codified as amended at 20 U.S.C.
§ 1681 (1988)), and interpretation of the securities laws, see, e.g., J.I. Case Co. v. Borak,
377 U.S. 426, 430-31 (1964) (recognizing private right of action under § 27 of the Secu-
rifles Exchange Act of 1934 for violations of § 14(a) of the Act); Superintendent of Ins.
v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971) (recognizing "established"
private right of action under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
193. Borak, 377 U.S. at 430-32 (denial of a right of action would be tantamount to a
denial of a deserved right of private relief).
194. 15 U.S.C. '§ 78n(a) (1988) (barring solicitation of proxies in violation of the rules
of the Securities and Exchange Commission).
195. Borak, 377 U.S. at 432.
196. Id. at 433.
197. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
198. Id. at 78. The Cort test asks (1) if the plaintiff in the class the statute was intend-
ed to benefit, (2) whether there is any explicit or implicit indication of legislative intent
to create or deny the remedy, (3) if it would be consistent with the underlying purposes
of the legislature to imply such a remedy, and (4) whether the cause of action is tradi-
tionally relegated to state law so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action
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tice Stevens claimed in Cannon v. University of Chicago,'99 that
the four-part test of Cort v. Ash can determine Congressional in-
tent,2r° at least three of the Cort factors seem to be the Court's
own assumptions about what "reasonable" legislators would do.20 1
For a time the Court veered away from Cort v. Ash toward a more
focused search for "congressional intent."2 2
Legislators would agree that the court should go beyond the
text of the statute in determining whether a private right of action
should be recognized. A clear indication of a legislative purpose to
allow private suits would require that courts carry it out even if the
text were inconsistent. In the absence of a clear indication of actual
purpose, a presumption in favor of a private right of action might
help avoid an erroneous interpretation if the presumption reflected
a well-established pattern of congressional action. A consistent
policy of authorizing private suits to enforce the securities laws
might justify a strong presumption that Congress intended to con-
tinue such a policy in light of a weak command to refuse to allow
private suites. One problem in relying on such a presumption is
that there is no well-established pattern of congressional policy.
The securities laws vary widely in their remedial provisions; some
provide for private actions while others, such as section 10(b) of
the 1934 Act, do not.20 3 Second, the more frequently a policy is
based solely on federal law?
199. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
200. Id. at 688.
201. Only the second factor, which looks to the legislative history, directly addresses
congressional intent.
202. See Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 578 (1979) ("The ultimate
question is one of congressional intent, not one of whether this Court thinks that it can
improve upon the statutory scheme that Congress enacted into law."); see also Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 812 (1986); Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 377-78 (1982). More recently, however, the
Cort/Cannon analysis has had something of a revival. See Thompson v. Thompson, 484
U.S. 174, 179-187 (1988) and Suter v. Artist M, 112 S. Ct. 1360, 1370 (1992).
203. Private actions are expressly authorized for several violations of the Act, including
§ 9(e), 15 U.S.C.S. § 78i(e) (authorizing private actions against manipulators of security
prices); § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (authorizing a private action by the issuer against an
insider who profited from short-term trading); and, § 18(a), 15 U.S.C.S. § 78r(a) (autho-
rizing private actions against any person who files a misleading statement with the SEC).
Other sections have no express cause of action, including § 10(b) of the 1934 Act, 15
U.S.C. 378(j), the provision at issue in Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964), and § 17(a), 15
U.S.C.S. § 78q(a), which requires broker-dealers and others to keep records and file re-
ports with the SEC, the provision at issue in Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S.
560, 562 (1979). This disparity in congressional treatment of various provisions was a
factor in the Court's decision not to recognize a private cause of action under § 17(a), 15
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contested in Congress, the less likely there is a well-established
policy. Congress has been occupied with increasingly political
controversies arising over remedial provisions.2
The lack of a well-established policy means there is no legisla-
tive supremacy justification for a strong presumption of a policy of
private causes of action. At best a weak presumption in favor of
private enforcement is warranted. Moreover, a legislative command
that does not expressly include a private authorization to sue is at
least a moderately clear statement of congressional policy to limit
remedies to those set out in the text.205 An express private reme-
dy provided in other provisions of the same statute would result in
,an even clearer statement. Table I suggests that a weak prior pre-
sumption and a moderately clear legislative statement pointing in
the opposite direction means that the court can be reasonably con-
fident that the most obvious meaning of the legislative command
reflects the true purpose.
There is an inevitable political dimension to this rule of inter-
pretation. Just as those who oppose a regulatory scheme will want
the court to construe the scheme narrowly, those who favor the
regulatory scheme will want the courts to make the scheme stron-
ger by inferring additional remedies.2t 6 If Congress consistently
authorized private actions in a particular area or if concern about
the costs of private enforcement were not such an important con-
cern of Congress, a stronger prior presumption in favor of private
enforcement might be warranted. Alternatively, if reliable legislative
history showed Congress's actual purpose was to authorize private
actions, the courts would be justified in interpreting the legislative
command in light of the legislative history. In the face of a moder-
U.S.C.S. § 78q(a). Id. at 571-72.
204. Three recent examples make the point. See Frank P. Grad, Remedies for Injuries
Caused by Hazardous Waste: the Report and Recommendations of the Superfund 301(e)
Study Group, 14 Envtl. L. Rep. 10,105, 10,105 (1984); Kerry E. Krobelsdorff, The Fight
over New Limits on Damages for Financial Fraud, CHRISTIAN Sa. MONITOR, April 21,
1988, at 10; Cindy Skrzycki, Civil Rights and Corporations: Executives Fear Hugh Dam-
age Awards as Result of Hiring Bill, WASH. POST, June 13, 1991, at B-11.
205. As a general principle, congressional silence about a policy issue is at least a weak
statement that Congress has taken no affirmative action with regard to the policy. Thus,
congressional silence about private enforcement is at least a weak statement against a
private cause of action since affirmative congressional action is required to create any
cause of action. Similarly, congressional silence about preemption of state law probably
counts as at least a weak statement against preemption since affirmative congressional
action is required to displace state law.
206. See Posner, Federal Courts, supra note 1, at 293 (1985).
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ately clear command against private enforcement and a weak or no
presumption favoring it, there is no legislative supremacy justifica-
tion for courts to go beyond the remedies set out in the legislative
command.
J. Summary: Legislative Supremacy and Presumptions
There is an appropriate role for policy presumptions in statuto-
ry interpretation under a legislative conception of legislative su-
premacy. In particular, courts may rely on presumptions to reduce
the problem of erroneous interpretation. Like any speaker, legisla-
tors want listeners to be cautious before assuming the legislators
mean to act dramatically differently from the way they have acted
before. The use of presumptions in these cases is justified because
it allows courts to revise the probability that the most obvious
meaning of a statute is the intended meaning.
A more explicit focus on the use of presumptions is helpful in
two ways. First, it illustrates what errors courts can make in inter-
preting unclear legislative commands. They can place too much or
too little weight on a presumption about the legislature's likely
policies. They can understate or overstate the strength or clarity of
the legislative command. Second, it provides a justification for
reliance on extra-legislative values consistent with a legislative
conception of legislative supremacy when the command, after con-
sidering presumptions, is genuinely unclear. These cases of true
ambiguity, where the legislative command is unclear even after a
thorough inquiry, and even after the appropriate use of presump-
tions, is the subject -of the next part of the article.
VIII. EXTRA-LEGISLATIVE VALUES
AND UNCERTAIN LEGISLATIVE COMMANDS
This part of the article discusses how legislators might view
genuinely ambiguous legislative commands. The term "genuinely
ambiguous" does not include legislative commands that leave poli-
cy decisions to the courts or to an administrative agency to re-
solve.2"7 When the legislature enacts a statute delegating
policymaking authority, courts exercising that authority do not
violate legislative supremacy. Moreover, a court's policymaking can
be quite expansive, as in a case applying a common law statute. It
207. See supra notes 53-64 and accompanying text.
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is possible to characterize this policymaking as "interpretation," but
it is interpretation in the sense that the interpretive task of the
court is to identify the parameters within which it can exercise its
policymaking authority. The legislative command conveys only the
policy parameters within which the courts must make policy; it
does not dictate the policy itself. For purposes of this discussion,
the category of "genuinely ambiguous" commands also excludes
textual statements that are clear only after readers turn to reliable
legislative history or the actual purposes of the statute. As argued
above, legislators want courts to conduct a thorough inquiry to
determine meaning. After such an inquiry, including the appropriate
use of presumptions, legislative commands can become clear.
"Genuinely ambiguous" commands are those that fail to resolve
certain issues even after a broad inquiry about legislative intent and
even after relying on appropriate presumptions. The command can
be ambiguous because the legislature failed to foresee a policy
question. 8 or because the legislature did not communicate the
resolution clearly. In Table I, for example, we can associate ambig-
uous legislative commands with the cells in the matrix where the
odds pointing in either direction are weak.209 The court has no
strong ground for deciding that the statute favors one policy or
another based on values communicated by the legislature. This
indeterminacy occurs not only in a case where the legislative com-
mand is unclear but in situations when a strong prior presumption
renders a relatively clear command ambiguous." 0
How would legislators want courts to go about dealing with
genuinely ambiguous commands? One possibility is that legislators
are indifferent as to how courts resolve the problem. They put
forth their best effort toward resolving all the policy questions that
were raised during consideration of the legislation. Now, their
policymaking has ended. At the other extreme, the legislature might
208. Like the legislature that is viewed as having a subjective "legislative intent," the
anthropomorphic legislature that "foresees" or fails to foresee a potential policy question is
in some way nonsensical and misleading. On the other hand, the notion that a policy
question was "unforeseen" is useful shorthand for the idea that no resolution of the policy
question can be found based on policies communicated by the legislature.
209. See supra notes 139-41 and accompanying text.
210. Table I suggests the result is indeterminate in situations when the prior presump-
tion and the command are of the same strength or relatively close in strength, e.g., a
weak presumption and a weak command and a moderately strong presumption and a
moderately clear command. In these cases, the strength of the presumption tends to offset
the strength of the command, leaving the legislative policy ambiguous.
1188 [Vol. 42:1129
1992] LEGISLATIVE SUPREMACY 1189
want courts to refrain from giving the statute effect at all, at least
in the case where the legislature failed to foresee that certain ques-
tions would arise. This part of the article argues that legislators
want courts to give effect to these statutes, but to do so by incor-
porating, to the extent possible, "reliable" extra-legislative values.
These are values that have the status of "law.
21
A. Legislative Preferences and Unclear Legislative Commands
When legislative commands are genuinely unclear, a court has
only two alternatives. First, it could refuse to apply the statute.21
Alternatively, it must derive at least some of the values from an
extra-legislative source and decide what weight to give them. De-
ciding which values are to be considered and what weight to give
to them will typically determine the outcome of the case. Thus, it
is a fair question whether the legislature wants the statute to be
implemented at all. One way of answering the question is a com-
mon sense argument based on legislative motive. Why would the
legislature have enacted the statute unless it wanted the courts to
211. Professors Farber and Frickey discuss the problem facing the judge who must
decide between various interpretations when the probability of one meaning is very close
to the probability of another meaning. See Farber & Frickey, supra note 22, at 961-65.
This is, of course, another way of saying that the "true" meaning is genuinely unclear.
They suggest one way for the judge to proceed: a rational judge should pick the interpre-
tation that maximizes the "payoff," the probability of a particular interpretation multiplied
by the consequences. Id. at 964. But, what is the payoff? And how is the judge to put a
value on the consequences? The argument in the following text relates to this notion in
that it suggests legislators want judges to proceed to implement statutes even in the face
of substantial uncertainty. A more persistent argument is that legislators want judges to
constrain their determination of the "payoff" by relying on values with the legitimacy of
majoritarian approval.
212. The grounds on which a court would refuse to apply a statute are not obvious. A
court might declare a statute unconstitutionally vague and, thus, violative of due process,
but this notion has been applied almost exclusively in the context of criminal statutes. See
Guzzardo v. Bengston, 643 F.2d 1300, 1304 (7th Cir. 1981) ("No man shall be held
criminally responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably understand to be pro-
scribed."); see also United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954) (declaring statute
void for vagueness on due process grounds). Nonetheless, the void for vagueness doctrine
applies in the case of civil statutes under some circumstances. "It is true that this Court
has held the 'void for vagueness' doctrine applicable to civil as well as criminal actions.
However, this is where 'the exaction of obedience to a rule or standard . . . was so
vague and indefinite as really to be no rule or standard at all . . .. '" Boutilier v. Immi-
gration & Naturalization Service, 387 U.S. 118, 123 (1967) (quoting A.B. Small Co. v.
Am. Sugar Ref. Co., 267 U.S. 233, 239 (1925)). The Court went on to hold that the
petitioner's deportation due to his homosexuality pursuant to the federal law was proper.
Id. at 123. The court reasoned that the statute did not regulate conduct and, as a result,
"no necessity exists for guidance so that one may avoid the application of the law." Id.
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find some way by which the statute could be implemented? If a
fair reading of the legislative command is that the court is autho-
rized to resolve the policy issue, that answer has substantial weight.
For example, the open-texture nature of common law statutes con-
veys a broad policymaking authority to the courts.2" 3
In the case where the legislative command does not appear to
authorize broad policymaking,214 a plausible argument exists that
legislators would prefer courts not attempt to resolve ambiguity in
order to avoid extensive judicial policymaking. 5 One problem
with this result is that it is decidedly asymmetrical. A refusal by
the courts to apply a statute systematically disadvantages those who
want to enforce it, or those who are protected by it, while it ad-
vantages those who are regulated by the statute. Thus, the effect of
refusing to apply statutes is consistently pro-defendant. Neverthe-
less, legislators might still favor a systematically pro-defendant rule
on the grounds that, a priori, there is no way of determining what
parties are likely to be favored or disfavored by such a rule of in-
terpretation for statutes in general.216
From the legislative perspective, however, there remains a more
fundamental problem. While a rule foregoing the implementation of
unclear statutes217 would preserve legislative policymaking from
encroachment by the courts, it also would force the legislature
continually to revise and clarify legislative commands in order to
addrss ven ino 1 qestons 218
address even minor policy questions. Practical experience with
the implementation of legislation shows how frequently truly am-
213. See supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text. Examples of "open-textured" statutes
include § 1983, the Sherman Act, and the Taft-Hartley Act.
214. For example, the legislative command might specify detailed resolutions of a series
of complex policy issues but simply fail to specify a resolution of one particular issue.
215. See Easterbrook, supra note 33, at 543-44. Under Judge Easterbrook's rule of in-
terpretation, statutes would not be applied unless the particular dispute arising under the
statute is either addressed by the statute directly or the statute creates a -common law
power of revision." Id. at 544.
216. It probably is the case that segments of society whose conduct is regulated, e.g.,
private business interests, are more likely to be defendants, while groups who have been
traditionally disadvantaged, e.g., the poor, the elderly and minority groups, are more likely
to benefit from the enforcement of statutes. Such a conclusion is not particularly easy to
prove empirically, however. Fortunately, the argument made here does not depend on
proving or disproving that conclusion.
217. See Farber & Frickey, supra note 22, at 488 (labelling such a rule the "four cor-
ners" rule).
218. Id. at 488-89 (noting that Congress currently can rely on the courts to resolve any
interpretation problems).
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biguous commands occur.219 Thus, the added burden on legisla-
tures would tend to undermine their effectiveness in general.'
Taking time to revise previously enacted statutes diverts attention
from currently pressing policy issues."' It drives up the costs of
legislating by making the actual task of enacting legislative policy
more time-consuming, perhaps impossible in some cases.m2 It
precludes a statute having any effect in the meantime, even if the
statute was intended to address a pressing social problem.
A more plausible assumption, then, is that legislators want
courts to find a way to implement the statute as long as the courts
have engaged in a good faith effort to interpret the command. If
the interpretation is incorrect, the legislature retains the remedy of
revising the statute. Legislative supremacy does not conflict with
reliance on extra-legislative values in these cases because the court
has tried to resolve the problem by relying on values communicat-
ed by the legislature. A court can put the statute into effect only
by turning to extra-legislative values as a "last resort."
B. Reliable Extra-Legislative Values
Even at this stage of expansive policymaking by the courts,
however, we can assume legislators want courts to be constrained
in choosing values upon which to rely. The assumption is that
legislators want courts to turn to values that are most "reliable,"
that is, most likely to command a social consensus, or at least the
support of a broad majority. Even though legislative policymaking
has, in a sense, been exhausted, legislators are wary of uncon-
strained and subjective policymaking by judges. Three sources of
values, in particular, have a strong claim to reliability: (1) the
Constitution itself, including values inherent in the constitutional
scheme, such as separation of powers, the stability of the legal sys-
tem, participation in the political process, and liberty and equality
under the law; (2) legislative policies established by other statutes;
and, (3) the policies of the common law.
These three sources of values have a strong claim to reliability
because they are "law," authoritative declarations of policy by
219. Id. at 488.
220. Id. (noting that "the 'four comers* rule would have undesirable practical effects").
221. Id. at 458.
222. See Farber & Frickey, supra note 22, at 958-59 (costs include transaction and
monetary costs).
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institutions legitimated by the nation to issue them.2 Such val-
ues do not have the legitimacy of institutionalized majoritarian
approval that occurs when a specific statute is enacted. However,
they rest on a higher plane of legitimacy than simply the personal
values of judges or even broad social values since each of these
categories of "law" can claim some aspect of formal majoritarian
approval.
Constitutional values in general, of course, have a high degree
of legitimacy, superior in a sense even to specific statutes. 4
There are two difficulties in relying on them, however. First, there
is inevitable uncertainty in deciding which of the broad range of
constitutional values is applicable in a particular case. Second, it is
difficult to determine the applicability of a constitutional "value" to
a legislative policy that does not actually violate a constitutional
225provision. Legislators would insist that they have the authority
to enact statutes, even if the statute approaches the "limits" of their
constitutional authority. 226 Therefore, legislators might insist that
no constitutional value is implicated even if a court might view the
statute as "encroaching" upon such values.
Legislative policies have legitimacy because a legislature -
though not necessarily the one that has enacted the statute that
must be interpreted - has affirmatively endorsed them. Thus, the
policies have a stamp of formal majoritarian approval. 27 Legisla-
tive policies are suspect, however, since there is genuine doubt
about how an enacting legislature would want a court to apply
legislative policies that might be derived in part by reference to a
separate statute, addressed to somewhat different policy issues, and
typically enacted by different legislators. Finally, long-standing
223. For an extensive discussion of the justification for incorporating these three sources
of values into statutory interpretation, see Eskridge, supra note 17, at 1019-61.
224. See id. at 1019. According to Eskridge, "[p]ublic values developed from the Con-
stitution have the greatest effect on statutory interpretation. This power partly results from
the special coercive force of constitutional values . . . .Also, constitutional values have
been articulated through a rich tradition of Supreme Court cases and extensive academ-
ic . . . theorizing." Id.
225. Enforcing a constitutional value beyond the terms of the Constitution itself has the
effect of expanding the range of constitutional protections. See Posner, supra note 166, at
816. Thus, the Constitution itself offers no guidance as to when this "expanded" protec-
tion should come into play.
226. See supra notes 169-73 and accompanying text.
227. See Eskridge, supra note 17, at 1036 ("While many statutes are not much more
than ad hoc deals, as the economists teach us, other statutes are sources for more endur-
ing values.").
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common law values have a certain degree of legitimacy from the
legislative perspective since the legislature has not reversed the
court-created doctrine. 8  Common law principles present the
weakest claim of legitimacy, however, as a result of their non-
majoritarian origins. Moreover, the imprimatur of majoritarian ap-
proval that might be inferred from legislative inaction is weaker
than affirmative legislative endorsement.29
Thus, while all three of these sources of extra-legislative values
have weaker claims to legitimacy than specifically legislative poli-
cies specifically endorsed in a statute, these sources are clearly
more legitimate than others that do not rise to the level of law. In
particular, they are more legitimate than a judge's own personal
values of justice. It is a fair assumption that legislators, blind to
their own political values,230 would prefer that courts limit their
search for appropriate values to law. Legislators' aversion to expan-
sive judicial policymaking would lead them to oppose a free-
wheeling search for values based on the courts' own sense of
priorities.
C. Applying Extra-Legislative Values
Assume arguendo that the courts in Albertini were entitled to
rely on a strong presumption that Congress would not limit
Albertini's freedom to re-enter the military base years later to
engage in peaceful protest. If the assumption were correct, any
legislative command pointing in the opposite direction creates am-
biguity. In that situation a court may, consistent with legislative
supremacy, rely on the strong First Amendment value of peaceful
protest to resolve the interpretive problem in favor of precluding
prosecution. Alternatively, the court could decide that the most
obvious meaning of the command allowing the prosecution should
be implemented. Regardless of the court's decision, there can be no
violation of legislative supremacy because the legislature has effec-
tively given no guidance at all. In a very real sense, the statute
228. See id. at 1051 ("[T]he common law can be used to fill in ... statutory gaps,
unless it is inconsistent with statutory policy.").
229. As a practical matter, many long-standing common law values have been codified.
Often a court referring to common law principles would be able to point to affirmative
legislative enactments supporting the same policies.
230. Recall the assumption that our hypothetical legislator must decide on rules of inter-
pretation in advance of knowing her political ideology. See supra note 51 and accompany-
ing text.
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means what the court decides it means.23" '
A theory of interpretation that justifies this use of extra-
legislative values grants enormous discretion to courts. Though
expansive, the policymaking is nevertheless constrained by legisla-
tive values. First and most importantly, the legislative command,
including the actual purpose of the legislature must be "genuinely
ambiguous." Second, if the court relies on a presumption, the pre-
sumption must be justified based on a legislative value, such as
avoiding erroneous interpretations by relying on established patterns
of legislative actions. Third, if a court turns to extra-legislative
values, the values must be reliable in the sense that they have been
legitimated as law. If this theory were applied in Albertini, the
Court would have reached the same conclusion that the most obvi-
ous meaning of the legislative command should prevail.232 This
conclusion results because one or more of the conditions justifying
reference to extra-legislative values was not satisfied in Albertini.
First, since the statutory text was clear and the legislative history
was consistent with the most obvious meaning of the text, the
legislative command was clear. Second, no well-established policy
exists that would justify a strong presumption in favor of peaceful
protest in this particular case.233
Another recent Supreme Court decision offers an illustration of
the legitimate use of extra-legislative values in the case of a truly
ambiguous legislative command. Green v. Bock Laundry Machine
Company,23 required the Supreme Court to interpret Federal Rule
of Evidence 609(a), dealing with the circumstances under which
testimony can be impeached by use of the prior criminal conviction
of the witness.235 The text of the rule seemed to allow courts to
231. Similarly, if the court believed that no presumption in either direction was warrant-
ed and the legislative command remained ambiguous, the court could look to to extra-
legislative values to resolve the problem. As a result, the court addressing the Albertini
facts would be free to rely on either a First Amendment value of peaceful protest or a
policy of discretion for military commanders to resolve the ambiguity. Whether the court
takes the step of attributing the policy to the legislature as a presumption underlying its
command or applies the value without referring back to the legislature, the statute ulti-
mately means what the court decides it means.
232. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
233. See supra notes 178-79 and accompanying text.
234. 490 U.S. 504 (1989).
235. Id. at 504. See also Randolph N. Jora Kait, The Supreme Court, Plain Meaning
and the Changed Rules of Evidence, 68 TEX. L. REV. 745, 758-59 (1990) (discussing
Bock Laundry as an example of a court rejecting a literal reading of a statute to avoid an
"irrational result").
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balance the prejudicial effect of admitting a prior conviction to
impeach the testimony of a defendant, but not to impeach the tes-
timony of a plaintiff. 6 In Bock Laundry, the defendant used the
criminal conviction of the plaintiff, a prisoner on a work-release
program, to impeach the plaintiff's testimony in his products liabil-
ity suit. The trial court allowed the conviction to be admitted, and
the jury returned a verdict for the defendant.2' The Court of Ap-
peals affirmed on the grounds that the rule required admission. 8
The Supreme Court also affirmed the judgment.2 9 However,
all the Justices concluded that the text of Rule 609(a) did not
reflect the rule's meaning.240 Justice Stevens concluded that the
rule's actual purpose was to protect criminal defendants, but not
the prosecution, from unfair prejudice. 24' Justice Blackmun ar-
gued that the actual purpose was to allow judicial balancing when-
ever any party could be harmed by the effect of admitting the con-
viction on the outcome of the litigation.242
The majority and the dissent turned to extra-legislative values
to interpret the rule. Justice Stevens relied upon the settled law of
evidence at the time of the adoption of Rule 609, which he con-
236. Bock Laundry, 490 U.S. at 509. At the time of the case, the rule provided:
For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that the
witness has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if elicited from the
witness or established by public record during cross-examination but only if the
crime (1) was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year
under the law under which the witness was convicted, and the court determines
that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial
effect to the defendant, or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless
of the punishment.
The rule has now been modified to provide expressly that the court
has no discretion to exclude the evidence described in subsection (1) for pur-
poses of impeaching a witness "other than an accused." Fed. R. Evid. 609.
237. Bock Laundry, 490 U.S. at 506.
238. Id. at 507.
239. Id. at 527.
240. Justice Stevens concluded in his opinion for the majority that "[n]o matter how
plain the text of the Rule may be, we cannot accept an interpretation that would deny a
civil plaintiff the same right to impeach an adversary's testimony that it grants to impeach
a civil defendant . . . . Rule 609(a)(1) 'can't mean what it says.'" Id. at 510-11 (quoting
Campbell v. Greer, 831 F.2d 700, 703 (1987). Justice Scalia opined that the statute, "if
interpreted literally, produces an absurd and perhaps unconstitutional result." Id. at 527.
(Scalia, J., concuAing in the judgment). The dissenters agreed that the rule could not
mean what it said. Id. at 530 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
241. Id. at 523-24.
242. Id. at 532-33 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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strued to require admission of the conviction.243 Justice Blackmun
turned to a number of extra-legislative values, including the un-
fairness of permitting an interpretation that would serve as a trap
for counsel who relied upon the text of the rule2" and the im-
portance of avoiding "unnecessary hardship," a value which he
argued was advanced by extending the protection of the rule to all
parties.24 Justice Scalia's concurrence turned to the extra-
legislative values of the "policy of the law in general and the
Rules of Evidence in particular ....
Bock Laundry is interesting from a number of perspectives.
First, it conforms with the result illustrated in Table I for the case
in which a very strong prior presumption offsets a moderately clear
command; the meaning of what appeared to be clear text was
ambiguous. Second, the majority opinion by Justice Stevens and
the dissenting opinion of Justice Blackmun relied upon a number
of different principles of interpretation. In effect, both opinions
discussed methods for resolving the interpretive problem employing
minimal judicial policymaking. Consistent with a legislative con-
ception of legislative supremacy, both opinions turned first to the
Congress' actual purpose in enacting the rule. If the actual purpose
could confidently be identified, a legislative conception of legisla-
tive supremacy would require that the Court rely upon it to resolve
the interpretive problem.
In fact, the congressional intent in Bock Laundry was some-
what unclear as shown by both the majority and dissent's inter-
pretation of key language in the report of the Conference Commit-
tee.247 As a result, the majority and the dissent felt obliged to
turn to other techniques of interpretation. Justice Stevens' final
argument for the majority relied upon an extra-legislative value -
the established law of evidence.248 Justice Blackmun's dissent and
243. Id. at 521-22.
244. Id. at 533-34.
245. Id. at 534-35.
246. Id. at 529.
247. Id. at 520 (concluding that the language reflected a policy of granting discretion in
the case of the impeachment of a criminal defendant only); id. at 532-33 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (concluding that the language reflected a policy of granting discretion in the
case of the impeachment of the testimony of all parties).
248. Id. at 521-22. Another way of looking at Justice Stevens' reliance on the law of
evidence would be to view his analysis as presuming that Congress would retain a well-
established policy. In fact, the majority opinion uses the language of presumptions. "A
party contending that legislative action changed settled law has the burden of showing
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Justice Scalia's concurrence both relied on extra-legislative values.
In my view, no opinion in Bock Laundry iq particularly satisfy-
ing. The most troubling aspect of Justice Stevens' opinion is that
the persons who appear to be protected by the text of the rule,
defendants in civil cases, are not. THis result conflicts with the
value of fair notice to future litigants who must rely on the rule.
One of the most troubling aspects of Justice Blackmun's opinion is
his reliance on extremely general extra-legislative values of avoid-
ing "unnecessary hardship" and reaching a "sensible result."249 It
is difficult to imagine more subjective and open-ended standards.
Nevertheless, the absence of a convincing analysis is understand-
able. The Court faced a particularly hard case - a statutory text
that produced a bizarre result and legislative history that showed
no obvious actual purpose. Each of the Justices in Bock Laundry,
even the most committed textualist, Justice Scalia, turned to extra-
legislative values to resolve the ambiguity Congress crbated. In
cases like this, courts do not violate the legislative conception of
legislative supremacy by turning to such values in crafting their
decisions
VII. CONCLUSION
It is misleading to frame the question of the proper approach
to statutory interpretation as a choice between respect for legisla-
tive supremacy and the freedom of the judiciary to engage in
policymaking. First, judicial policymaking is consistent with a
legislative conception of legislative supremacy when it is autho-
rized by the legislature, as long as the extent of the policymaking
is confined to the scope of the authorization. Second, when legisla-
tive commands are "genuinely ambiguous," a court has no alterna-
tive except to turn to extra-legislative values to resolve the inter-
pretive problem. The choice of extra-legislative values and the
decision about what weight to give them are important forms of
judicial policymaking.
The conception of legislative supremacy described here has
much in common with the public values analysis suggested by
others. Public values scholars emphasize reliance on extra-
that the legislature intended such a change." Id. at 521 (citations omitted). However, it is
difficult to say that Congress itself, as opposed to the federal and state courts, had any
established policy since its first significant involvement with these issues occurred in
connection with the approval of Rule 609.
249. See id. at 534-35.
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legislative values that have acquired the legitimacy of formal incor-
poration into law.250 Public values analysis also may limit reli-
ance on these values only to cases where the legislative command
is ambiguous. Nevertheless, there are some important differences
between a public values analysis and the approach argued here. A
legislative conception of legislative supremacy justifies reliance on
extra-legislative values only as a last resort in statutory interpreta-
tion. In most cases, a legislative command can be interpreted by
relying on a technique that involves less expansive policymaking
by courts. If judges move too quickly to incorporate extra-legisla-
tive values, they violate legislative supremacy by unnecessarily
exercising their own policymaking authority at the expense of the
legislature's. In particular, overstating the strength of a public poli-
cy presumption or understating the clarity of a legislative command
can lead to a violation of legislative supremacy.
The use of presumptions can be very similar to the incorpora-
tion of extra-legislative values when legislative commands are
unclear. A presumption that the legislature would not preempt state
law, for example, can have the same effect as the incorporation of
a federalism value into interpretation. Moreover, the strength attrib-
uted to a presumption can simply reflect the weight that the court
chooses to place upon the presumption. By giving some presump-
tions little weight and others subsfantial weight, the court can en-
gage in judicial policymaking under the guise of relying on pre-
sumptions about the legislature's "intended" policies.
There is a clear difference, however, between a public values
reliance on extra-legislative values and the use of presumptions
under a legislative conception of legislative supremacy. Some pre-
sumptions are consistent with legislative supremacy; some are not.
While public values analysis must justify reliance on presumptions
because the presumptions reflect desirable social norms, a legisla-
tive conception of legislative supremacy requires courts to rely only
on presumptions that legislators would favor, particularly those
grounded in a well-established legislative policy. Moreover, courts
must give appropriate weight to presumptions. If the legislative
command is clear enough, even a strong presumption cannot justify
courts' refusal to implement the most obvious meaning of the
command.
That courts almost never openly disregard the principle of
250. In particular, see the discussion by Professor Eskridge, supra note 17, at 1017-61.
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legislative supremacy suggests a deep respect for the legislature's
policymaking authority. Even textualists ultimately argue that courts
should rely on the text of statutes because it is the most reliable
statement of the legislature's policy. It seems doubtful that an
approach to interpretation that openly ignored legislative commands
or that cavalierly disregarded at least some version of "legislative
intent" could ever take root. Respect for legislative supremacy is
likely to remain at the core of statutory interpretation no matter
how powerful the critiques of the political process. My argument is
that a legislative conception of legislative supremacy creates a
framework for identifying principles of interpretation consistent
with what we can assume legislators would want. Such a frame-
work preserves an expansive role for judicial policymaking and, in
some aspects of interpretation, e.g., determining when a command
is "uncertain," it provides some guidance for courts to determine
when reliance on extra-legislative values is consistent with legisla-
tive supremacy. Yet the framework preserves legislative
policymaking authority to the extent possible consistent with giving
effect to statutes.
There are some obvious objections to the basic conception of
legislative supremacy argued throughout the article. First, the as-
sumptions about legislators' basic values may be incorrect. Howev-
er, the assumptions seem cautious enough - legislators want stat-
utes to be given effect in the real world and they jealously guard
their own policymaking authority. Contrary assumptions, for exam-
ple, that legislators care little about whether their statutes have an
effect, are far more difficult to justify. Critics might also argue that
courts have no particular obligation to comply with the legislature's
preferred rules of interpretation. This argument fails, however, be-
cause if the legislature has supreme policymaking authority, it also
has the authority to determine how its commands are to be inter-
preted. A contrary assumption would mean that legislators have the
authority to set policy, but not the authority to oversee interpreta-
tion of its directives.
A final objection might be that the task of identifying
legislators' preferences regarding principles of interpretation is too
speculative to be useful. In other words, even though courts should
not ignore legislators' preferred principles of interpretation, it is
impossible to identify those principles. Such an objection does have
some validity since there is no way of confirming what principles
of interpretation legislators really do favor. Nevertheless, it is use-
ful to ask the question - is a particular technique of interpretation
119919921
1200 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:1129
likely to be inconsistent with what legislators would want? If so,
there are strong grounds viewing that technique with skepticism.
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Appendix - Applications of Probability Theory
Introduction
Probability theory is useful in illustrating some aspects of the
problem of unclear legislative statements. In order to take advan-
tage of probability theory, we can analogize statements about a
policy that the legislature communicates to a "population" of
events. The statement that the legislature communicates about a
policy does not always correctly reflect the legislature's actual
meaning, just as the results of a testing procedure do not always
accurately reflect the "true" state of the world.
In the case of a testing procedure, there is .some probability
that the results of a test, e.g., a laboratory analysis, will be positive
for the presence of disease when there is no disease (i.e., a false
positive) and some probability that the results will be negative
when disease is actually present (i.e., a false negative). Similarly,
we can-assume that, whatever policy the legislature is attempting to
enact, there is always some probability that the legislature commu-
nicates the policy incorrectly. As a result, a "population" that cor-
responds to statements about a particular policy includes a variety
of different possible statements. Most of the statements drawn from
this population will reflect the actual policy, but some will not.
Assume, for example, that the legislature is attempting to com-
municate policy A. There is less than 100 percent probability, e.g.,
eighty percent, that the legislative statement will actually communi-
cate policy A. There is a twenty percent probability that policy B
will be communicated. Similarly, if the legislature is attempting to
communicate policy B, there is only an eighty percent probability
that policy B will be communicated and a twenty percent probabili-
ty that policy A will be communicated. The two policies - A and
B - correspond to two different populations from which sample
observations are drawn. These sample observations are the public
record statements made by the legislature, such as the statutory
text, legislative history, and other bits of information relevant to
determining the meaning. The problem in the case of any particular
statement or set of statements is to determine whether they were
drawn from population A or B. If we assume that the legislature
speaks clearly about eighty percent of the time, a statement point-
ing toward meaning A will still have a twenty percent probability
that the legislature is actually attempting to communicate meaning
B, and vice versa.
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Analysis I
This article asserts that it is more likely two listeners will
agree that a certain meaning is the most likely meaning than that
they will agree that a particular meaning is clear. It is possible to
illustrate this point by analogizing the policies that the legislature
is attempting to communicate with populations from which sample
observations are drawn. Assume that the legislature wants to com-
municate meaning A and that eighty percent of the time the mean-
ing is correctly conveyed, i.e., eighty percent of the "events" or
bits of information in the underlying population point toward
meaning A and twenty percent point toward meaning B. Assume
that a small sample of ten observations is drawn from the popula-
tion. Assume further that a person reviewing the sample will con-
clude that meaning A is most likely if most of the sample observa-
tions (i.e., at least six) point in that direction. Finally, assume that
the person will conclude that meaning A is "clear" only if at least
eighty percent (i.e., at least eight of ten) observations point in that
direction.
The odds that at least r of n sample observations will point
toward meaning A can be derived by adding the probabilities of
exactly x observations of A where x ranges from r to n. Where the
probability of x observations of A in n trials is P, the probability
of at least r observations of A is:
Fortunately, we can find this probability from a table of cumu-
lative values for the binomial distribution.21 In the example
above, the odds that at least six of ten observations will point
toward meaning A is .967. However, the odds that at least eight of
ten observations will point toward meaning A is only .678. Thus,
based on a single sample of ten observations, it is about forty-three
percent more likely that A will be viewed as the most obvious
meaning than that it will be viewed as "clearly" the meaning -
(.967/.678 = 1.43). If each of two evaluators, say two judges,
251. See FREDERICK MOsTErER ET AL., PROBABH.ITY WITH STATISTICAL APPuCATIONS
474 (1970).
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draws a different sample of bits of information, they will agree that
the A is the most likely meaning ninety-four percent of the time -
(.967)(.967) = .94. However, they will agree that meaning A is
clear only forty-six percent of the time - (.678)(.678) = .46.
Analysis II
The analogy of an underlying population and the meaning
communicated by the legislature is also helpful in understanding
the relationship of presumptions about meaning and the clarity of
statements of policy communicated by the legislature. Again, as-
sume that the underlying population from which the observed in-
formation is drawn is either A or B, corresponding to meaning A
or B. Also, assume that the legislature communicates its meaning
clearly about eighty percent of the time. Thus, for example, even if
the information communicated by the legislature appears to point
toward meaning A, there is a twenty percent chance that the
legislature's actual meaning is B.
Bayesian inference provides a way of taking into account a
prior probability in evaluating the chance that an observed event
was drawn from a particular population. 2 Thus, it provides a
technique for taking into account a presumption about the
legislature's likely actions in evaluating the likely meaning of the
statement actually conveyed by the legislature. One can place some
personal "probabilities on the "prior" presumption, i.e., the subjec-
tive probability before observing the legislature's actual statement,
that the legislature would act in a certain way. For example, one
could assume that there is a ninety percent chance that the legisla-
ture would not preempt state law. Where Prior-P(R) is the subjec-
tive prior probability that the legislature will act in a certain way,
e.g., to retain an established policy, P(C/R) is the probability that
the legislative statement would indicate a desire to retain the policy
even if the legislature intended to change the policy and P(PR) is
the probability that the legislative statement would indicate a desire
to retain the policy if, in fact, the legislature did intend to retain
the policy. Post-P(R) is the posterior probability that the legislature
intends to retain the policy given that the command indicates an
intent to retain it, and this probability can be determined by the
252. For a straightforward discussion of the techniques of Bayesian inference, see WIL-
IAM MENDENHAL., INTRODUCTION TO PROBABILITY AND STATISTICS 80-82 (1975).
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following formula:
Post-P(R) = [Prior-P(R)P(R/R)]/[Prior-P(R)P(R/R) +
(1-Prior-P(R))P(C/R)]
For example, assume Congress rarely preempts state law and,
thus, there is a strong subjective prior probability, say ninety per-
cent, that the Congress will not do so in any particular case. As-
sume further that, if the legislature intends to retain this policy,
there is an eighty percent likelihood that this policy will be reflect-
ed in the legislative command, and, conversely, that if the legisla-
ture intends to change the policy, there is still a twenty percent
chance that the statement will point toward retaining the policy.
The probability that Congress did not intend to preempt state law
given that the command does not reflect an intent to preempt state
law is:
(.9)(.8)/[(.9)(.8) + (.1)(.2)] = (.72)/(.74) = 97.3%
On the other hand, if the legislative statement points toward
revising the policy, i.e., preempting state law, the posterior proba-
bility that the legislature is actually preempting state law is:
(.2)(.8)/[(.2)(.8) + (.9)(.2) = .16/.34 = 47%.
The very strong prior presumption means that the legislative
command is still uncertain even though it points toward preempting
state law.
Analysis III
A somewhat more complex analysis takes into account the
clarity of the legislative command. Rather than assume that a legis-
lative statement simply points in one direction or another, as was
assumed in Analysis II, we can rank the clarity of commands from
"weak" (slightly pointing in one direction but fairly ambiguous) to
"very strong" (quite clearly pointing in one direction). If the state-
ments of the legislature, including the statutory text, legislative
history and other relevant indications of legislative intent are
viewed as bits of information, we can draw an analogy between
these bits of information and a set of sample observations drawn
from one of the underlying populations. Bayesian inference pro-
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vides a way to adjust the prior probability that the legislature
wouldtake a certain action based on observing a certain number of
observations out of a sample that point toward a particular mean-
ing. The clarity or "strength" of the command increases as the
number of observations in a particular sample pointing in a certain
direction increases.
Another more realistic assumption is that the likelihood of the
legislature speaking in an incorrect or ambiguous way depends on
the policies it intends to convey. If the legislature is adopting a
newly developed or untraditional policy - meaning A - we retain
the assumption described above, i.e., there is an eighty percent
chance that A will be communicated. However, when the legisla-
ture is simply retaining a well-established policy - meaning B -
the legislature is more likely to be ambiguous. It may say little
about the policy issue at all or its statements may seem to point
equally toward A or B. We can incorporate this idea into Bayesian
inference by assuming that in the case where the legislature is
simply retaining a well-established policy - meaning B - we as-
sume that there is a fifty percent chance that any sample observa-
tion will point toward meaning A and a fifty percent chance it will
point toward meaning B.
Where Prior(B)/Prior(A) are the prior odds that the legislature
will act in a certain way (i.e., policy or meaning B),
Post(B)/Post(A) are the posterior odds that the legislature is acting
consistently with meaning B, P(A/B) is the probability that a sam-
ple observation will reflect meaning A if the legislature is attempt-
ing to communicate meaning B, P(B/B) is the probability that'a
sample observation will reflect meaning B if the legislature is
attempting to communicate meaning B, P(A/A) is the probability
that a sample observation will reflect meaning A if ihe legislature
is attempting to communicate meaning A, and P(A/B) is the proba-
bility that a sample observation will reflect meaning A if the legis-
lature is attempting to communicate meaning B, x is the number of
observations in the sample pointing toward meaning A, and n is
the total number of sample observations, Post(B)/Post(A) can be
calculated based on the following formula:
Post(B)/Post(A) =
[Prior(B)/Prior(A)] X [P(A/B) P(B/B) ]/[P(A/A) P(B/A)]
It is possible to construct a table of prior and posterior proba-
bilities, based on different assumptions about prior probabilities and
sample observations to get some sense of how they are related.
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The assumptions are these:
1) the sample size in each case is ten;
2) there are two possible meanings - "A" and "B." The num-
ber of observations pointing toward meaning "A" is x and the
number pointing toward "B" is 10-x;
3) if the legislature's policy is A, there is an eighty percent
chance that any single observation will point toward A and twenty
percent chance it will point toward B; on the other hand, if the
legislature's policy is B, there is a fifty percent chance B will be
communicated and a fifty percent chance that B will be communi-
cated (i.e., there is an equal chance the statement will point in
either direction);
4) there are three categories of prior odds:
Weak - 2:1
Strong - 5:1
Very Strong - 10:1
5) we group the possible sample observations (i.e., the number
of observations pointing toward meaning A out of a sample of ten)
into four categories, corresponding to the strength of the statement
pointing toward meaning A:
Weak - x = 7
Moderately Clear - x = 8
Very Clear - x = 9
Table I-A. Posterior Odds of A or B
Clarity of Command
Pointing Toward A
Prior Odds Weak Moderately Very Clear
of B (7 of 10) Clear (9 of 10)
(8 of 10)
Weak "Even" Moderate Strong for A
(2:1) (for B 1.16:1) for A 12.5:1
3.33:1
Strong Weak for B "Even" Moderate
(5:1) 2.9:1 (for A 1.33:1) for A
5:1
Very Strong Moderate "Even" Weak for A
(10:1) for B (for B 1.5:1) 2.5:1
5.9:1
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NOTE: In cases where the posterior odds of policy A or B are
less than 2:1, the table describes the resulting odds as "even." (The
actual odds are shown in parentheses.)
Comments
The table reflects some intuitively reasonable conclusions. For
example, a moderately clear statement pointing toward A remains
ambiguous in the face of a strong prior assumption in favor of B.
However, a very clear command reverses strong odds toward B to
moderate odds toward A. These results illustrate the proposition
that the legislature must speak clearly in order to reverse a well-
established policy. When the prior odds are very strong, the odds
continue to be moderately strong that B is correct even when the
command points weakly toward A. This result is an illustration of
the proposition that even a clear command will not be applied if
the result is "bizarre." Several combinations lead to very ambigu-
ous results. If we define ambiguous results as those where neither
the odds of A or B are greater than 2:1, the resulting odds are
even in the cases of (1) weak prior odds and a weak command, (2)
strong prior odds and a moderately clear command, and (3) very
strong prior odds and a moderately clear command.
The results achieved here are not meant to be precise indicators
of odds. They are only meant to illustrate the essential relationship
of certain probabilistic assumptions. In particular, they show that
probability theory confirms the intuitive notions that judges often
use.
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